Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2013

Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors
Jim Rossi
Thomas Hutton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jim Rossi and Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 North Carolina Law
Review. 1283 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/551

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Nov 17 10:57:44 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 1283 (2013).
ALWD 7th ed.
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L.
Rev. 1283 (2013).
APA 7th ed.
Rossi, J., & Hutton, T. (2013). Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors. North
Carolina Law Review, 91(4), 1283-1356.
Chicago 17th ed.
Jim Rossi; Thomas Hutton, "Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors," North
Carolina Law Review 91, no. 4 (May 2013): 1283-1356
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, "Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors" (2013) 91:4
NC L Rev 1283.
AGLC 4th ed.
Jim Rossi and Thomas Hutton, 'Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors' (2013) 91
North Carolina Law Review 1283.
MLA 8th ed.
Rossi, Jim, and Thomas Hutton. "Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors." North
Carolina Law Review, vol. 91, no. 4, May 2013, p. 1283-1356. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, 'Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors' (2013) 91 NC
L Rev 1283
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND CLEAN
ENERGY FLOORS*
JIM Rossi** & THOMAS HUTroN*
Federalpolicies regardingrenewable and clean energy often lack
clear definition, are incomplete, and are scattered across multiple
statutes and agencies. Yet at the same time, recent decisions of
both federal agencies and courts have attributed a preemptive
effect to federal statutes that threatens to hobble innovation in
renewable and clean energy policy by subnational regulators.
This approach channels the most impactful policies promoting
clean and renewable energy toward subsidies from the federal
fisc, rather than diverse policies undertaken independently by
state and local governments or regionalcustomers and suppliers.
This Article argues that, contrary to many agency and judicial
decisions, the text, structure, history, and purpose of key federal
energy statutes do not require a singular approach to federalism
in clean energy policy. Borrowing from environmental law, we
plant a flag for a preemption approach that we call a "clean
energy floor." We show that clean energy floors are consistent
with the structure, history, and purpose of federal energy
legislation, including both New Deal and more modern statutes.
As a normative matter, we also argue that a reading of federal
energy statutes to incorporateregulatoryfloors is a good idea, to
the extent that it allows federal and subnationalenergy regulators
an opportunity to work together to overcome problems of
fragmentation, stagnation and stalemate. This approach is
especially well-suited for addressing important issues related to
climate change and new technologies such as renewable energy
and natural gas fracking, even absent new congressional action
or completely defined federal policy. Our approach to what we
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call "energy federalism"-and as applied to subnational clean
energy regulation, what we call "clean energy federalism"--also
has some important implicationsfor how courts should interpret
other statutes in the regulatory contexts where federal and state
authority are often perceived as substitutes for one another,such
as healthcare.
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INTRODUCTION

When there is no clear national direction for energy initiatives,
regulators are more likely to work at cross-purposes, as is reflected by
the fragmented subnational approaches to natural gas fracking
regulation.' In areas where federal law preempts any state or local
regulation, the scope of innovation by subnational units of
government' is limited, contributing to policy stagnation and, in some
instances, overreliance on technology subsidies by the federal
government.3 In addition, where regulatory jurisdiction is highly
uncertain, federalism can contribute to policy inaction-a stalemate
in which neither subnational nor national decision makers perceive
that they have the prerogative to act to solve complex regulatory
problems.' For example, U.S. climate change policy for the energy
sector suffers from a simultaneous lack of clear national direction and
inconsistent state and local attention to the issue.' This Article
identifies what we call a "clean energy floor" as a way of addressing
these problems with fragmentation, stagnation, and stalemates in
energy law, and generalizes its lessons for assessing the effects of
preemption in the context of other multi-purpose statutes.
1. See generally Jody Freeman, Op-Ed., The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling,N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2012, at A23 (proposing that Congress lift regulatory exemptions for
hydraulic fracturing to allow EPA to set minimum requirements for drilling which states
would then implement through federally approved programs).
2. As used in this Article, "subnational" regulators include state and local
authorities. They also include, in appropriate contexts, Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs), which are multi-state, non-governmental organizations that
control transmission lines and ensure nondiscriminatory access to those lines. As described
in greater detail infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text, RTOs exercise certain
regulation-like influence over electricity market participants in certain contexts.
3. See STEPHAN DOLEZALEK & JOSHUA FREED, AN AMERICAN KODAK MOMENT:
WHAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
RESPONDING TO DISRUPTIVE NEw ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 4 (Apr. 2012),
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/514/ThirdWayReportAnAmerican Kodak
Moment.pdf; JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BEYOND BOOM & BUST: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON
http://www.
(2012),
7
INDEPENDENCE
SUBSIDY
TO
A
PATH
brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2012/4/18%20clean%20investments%20mur
o/0418_clean_investments final%20paperpdf.
4. See generally Jim Rossi, The Electric DeregulationFiasco: Looking to Regulatory
Federalismto Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100
MICH, L. REV. 1768 (2002) ("[T]he legal resolution of jurisdictional boundaries plays a
significant role in the development of sound deregulatory policies.").
5. See Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/107/
(2008),
63, 65-66
IMPRESSIONS
carlson.pdf.
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Like many traditional areas of regulation, energy law has long
embraced jurisdictional clarity as its main approach to resolving
federal preemption problems. Conventional agency and judicial
interpretations of electric power and natural gas statutes define
distinct and independent jurisdictional spheres for states, on the one
hand, and national regulators, on the other. To take one example, no
one questions that under existing statutes states retain broad
regulatory authority over most aspects of natural gas fracking
activities, despite the fact that Congress has adopted legislation to
regulate the interstate natural gas industry and many types of
pollution associated with natural gas extraction.6
For another example of distinct subnational and national
regulation, consider the division of regulatory authority in the electric
power sector. Congress adopted legislation to regulate electricity in
the 1930s, expanding the reach of federal jurisdiction with the
enactment of every subsequent major energy statute.' As the
Supreme Court noted in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi,' "[lIt is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of
interstate commerce than electric energy . . . ."I The entire field of

electric power regulation of public utilities is certainly considered to
be within Congress's power to preempt, if it so chooses, as a result of
its Commerce Clause authority."o Yet Congress has also consistently
protected the role of states in regulating electric power, and state and
local governments retain considerable control over the activities of
electric power firms. Specifically, states enjoy almost complete
authority over issues related to the retail pricing of electric power
sold by utilities, and states also decide key issues related to the mix of
energy firms' power generation portfolios, including what percentage
of energy comes from renewable sources."
6. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the PoliticalEconomy of
Energy Production 3, 12 (Uiv. Tex. Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 222,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2017280.
7. See Jeffrey S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and
Regulation: A Look Back, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2010, at 33-35.
8. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
9. Id. at 757.
10. Id.
11. Section 201(b) of the Federal Power Act ("FPA") expressly states that the
statute's reach, and thus the jurisdiction of federal energy regulators, does not extend to
power distribution or to facilities used for the generation of electric energy. 16 U.S.C.
§ 824(b) (2006). For discussion of the dual jurisdictional approach outlined in the FPA and
statutory limits on the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"), see New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002) (stating that FERC's jurisdiction
over the sale of power is "specifically confined to the wholesale market").
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This well-entrenched approach to federal preemption in energy
statutes-clearly defining lines of authority to mediate federal and
state conflicts-is premised on assumptions that state autonomy
matters (whether for the purpose of protecting subnational
sovereignty1 2 or some other objective), that federal and state
governments can serve as substitutes for each other, and that courts
will delineate the boundaries of authority between them where
Congress itself has failed to do so. On this view, the expansion of
federal authority by Congress typically entails an equal and opposite
contraction of state power, in particular through the adoption of
"ceiling" preemption, which produces consistent "unitary" national
standards. Conversely, state and local authority over energy expands
in response to a lack of federal attention to the relevant issues,
including where the national government has failed to adopt a clear
policy, for example, in the area of climate change regulation.
In this Article we argue that the interpretive approach to
preemption in U.S. energy statutes by courts and agencies should
parallel the approach to environmental statutes: absent clear evidence
of a congressional purpose to adopt unitary standards or an obvious
conflict or obstacle to a clearly defined regulatory program, courts
and agencies should generally favor what is known as floor
preemption over ceiling preemption in the context of energy statutes.
U.S. energy statutes do not require a conventional approach to
federalism, in which matters are either governed by a unitary federal
standard that excludes state and local regulation through preemption
(especially when the federal standard serves as a ceiling) or,
conversely, left entirely to states. This unitary preemption approach is
likely to be incongruous to the extent it is applied to efforts to protect
and advance environmental values in the energy industry-a cluster
of policies we call "clean energy" regulation. Some subnational
governments have the policy preference to undertake the potential
cost and risk of clean energy regulation in exchange for the perceived
benefits of new environmental or regulatory requirements. If the
subnational government's clean energy policy touches the pervasive
federal energy regulatory regime, applying the traditional unitary
approach to preemption in energy law may preclude the subnational
governments from implementing their desired policies.

12. We use the term sovereignty sparingly in this context, out of recognition that not
all federalism debates are about interference with "sovereignty," per se. Of equal concern
to such debates are functional goals that can be served by altering the balance of power
between national and subnational governments.
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Our analysis of floor preemption as well-suited to federal energy
statutes hinges on the oft-overlooked distinction between the
substantive supremacy of federal law (which is unassailable), and the
regulatory effects of preemption. In the intellectually kindred area of
environmental regulation, what is known as "floor preemption""
determines the effects of federal supremacy for a number of statutes.
Floor preemption treats federal law as providing only a minimum that
precludes more lax state standards, leaving states the authority to
adopt more restrictive requirements for certain pollutants.1 4 Such a
preemption tool can reconcile the supremacy of federal law with the
benefits of subnational regulatory innovation. Unlike the
conventional approach to federalism in energy statutes, floor
preemption does not view federal and state laws as mutually exclusive
substitutes for each other. Rather, federal law sets basic goals and
provides direction, but state and local regulators are allowed to
innovate by adopting regulations not inconsistent with, or advancing,
these goals. Under floor preemption, and its accompanying
"cooperative federalism" model, federal and state jurisdiction are not
independent or mere substitutes, but are interdependent and
complementary.15
Drawing from this environmental law analogy, we set out to
undertake the first comprehensive effort to articulate an alternative
approach to federalism in energy law that is attentive to preemption
tools such as floor standards. The prevailing judicial approach to
preemption is far from resolved across the multiple federal statutes
that address energy, but to date, many signs from federal courts are
not encouraging for clean energy. Courts have always understood
Congress to have preempted areas such as interstate natural gas
sales" and nuclear safety." Federal regulators also have clear
authority to regulate the price of electricity sold for resale (i.e.,

13. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547,1548 (2007).
14. See id. at 1551. For extended discussion see infra Part II.
15. As a preemption tool, floor standards are consistent with a theory that has come
to be known as cooperative federalism, which contrasts with more traditional notions of
state sovereignty or process federalism. For discussion of these three distinct approaches
to federalism, see generally Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1549 (2012) (suggesting that a wide range of federalism theories can be seen in the
U.S. system).
16. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1988).
17. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 205 (1983); N. States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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"wholesale" electricity), which is presumed to be roughly coextensive
with electricity sold in interstate commerce." Yet several recent
agency and judicial decisions have interpreted this authority as having
a unitary preemptive effect on the state pricing of electricity, 9
effectively imposing a ceiling on important state pricing mechanisms
designed to encourage clean energy, such as feed-in tariffs for
renewable energy.2 0 Contrary to the predominant judicial
interpretations behind these decisions, we maintain that the most
important federal energy statutes are consistent with a range of
different approaches to preemption, including regulatory floors.
Consequently, in areas where federal statutory goals for complex
regulatory issues can be identified, courts should not necessarily
presume that federal statutes are designed to adopt a unitary national
policy, leaving little or no authority to subnational regulators.
Contrary to what conventional federalism in energy law may suggest,
courts also should not necessarily view a substantive preemption
choice under an energy statute as limiting state regulators' autonomy.
We show how key energy statutes can be interpreted to allow a floor
preemption paradigm with respect to clean energy policies and other
energy regulation innovations by subnational regulators.
Part I of this Article describes several prominent examples of
preemption tools in environmental law to provide a background for a
discussion of clean energy policies. Environmental law scholars extol
floor preemption, 21 an approach that Congress has adopted in many
federal environmental statutes where it has chosen to preempt state
law. 22 As we highlight, absent a clear indication of an explicit
congressional purpose to adopt a unitary standard approach, the
judicial approach to interpreting most standards in environmental
statutes strongly favors the tool of floor preemption-at least when
federal law has a substantive supremacy effect at all. The federal floor
in many federal environmental standards addresses fragmentation,

18. See Federal Power Act § 201(c)-(d), 16 U.S.C. § 824(c)-(d) (2006).
19. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a
Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1594 (2003).
20. These decisions are discussed infra at Part II.B.
21. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and
Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 261, 269 (2008); Buzbee, supra note 13, at
1592; Erin Ryan, NegotiatingFederalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (2011).
22. The fundamental question these examples raise, and which this Article addresses,
relates to preemption tools-how the form of preemption has supremacy effects on
subnational regulation. A related question is whether there is any substantive preemption
at all, but in most scenarios where preemption tools are at issue, some initial substantive
preemption determination already has been made.

1290

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

primarily by avoiding the problem of a "race to the bottom" with
respect to environmental standards among states and localities
competing to host industry.2 3 Simultaneously, floor preemption can
overcome stagnation and overreliance on federal subsidies by leaving
space for subnational regulatory innovation, an opportunity that we
maintain states and localities often put to good use.24 Moreover, the
multiplicity of regulators in areas subject to floor preemption means
that the regulated area benefits simply from increased regulatory
attention, which helps to overcome stalemates. 25
Part II considers the allocation of authority between federal and
subnational governments in the context of the energy statutes. The
area of clean energy regulation has become a battleground of
doctrinal heritage between environmental law, for which floor
preemption is the norm, and conventional federalism in energy law,
for which unitary federal choice preemption is favored by agency and
judicial decisions.26 Questions relating to the effects of preemption in
federal energy statutes are likely to proliferate as new technologies
such as fracking emerge, and as subnational policymakers develop
new mechanisms to encourage clean energy.
Unitary preemption has the virtue of providing for clear
allocations of authority between federal and subnational law. Under
such an approach, which we maintain describes the predominant
23. See Buzbee, supra note 13, at 1551-52 (describing the theory that "without federal
regulation, states would enact suboptimally lax environmental standards in an effort to
attract and retain industry"). Of course, the idea of a "race to the bottom" problem is not
universally accepted. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for FederalEnvironmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211-12 (1992) (arguing that "contrary to prevailing assumptions,
competition among states for industry should not be expected to lead to a race that
decreases social welfare," and that "federal regulation aimed at dealing with the asserted
race to the bottom, far from correcting evils of interstate competition, is likely to produce
results that are undesirable"). But see Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental StandardSetting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274-75 (1997)
(critiquing the race-to-the-bottom concept in the wake of the Revesz article, supra).
24. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
25. Andreen, supra note 21, at 302 ("[T]he institutional diversity preserved by floor
preemption would offer the nation a multiplicity of venues in which policy choices could
be explored as well as some protection against the risk of regulatory failure."); see also
Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 811, 812 (2008)
("[P]reemption eliminates the institutional diversity and attendant benefits of plurality,
dialogue, and redundancy that federalism offers.").
26. While ceiling preemption is familiar in energy law, in other significant ways energy
law has reflected a respect for state prerogatives. Most important is the authority states
have retained to regulate retail electricity rates, although the federal government enjoys
exclusive authority over wholesale rates. See Federal Power Act § 201(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.

§ 824(b)(1) (2006).
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judicial interpretation of statutes in the electric power context,
industry enjoys a national standard and need not tailor its activities to
suit numerous regulators across smaller or more regional markets.
But this uniformity benefit comes at the expense of hobbling the most
nimble and inventive policymakers.2 7 Another foregone benefit
inherent in unitary federal preemption relates to the multi-purpose
character of federal energy statutes: by precluding states and localities
from pursuing more aggressive clean energy policies, courts may
inhibit the achievement of goals embodied in the very same federal
law being construed to preempt subnational regulation. For instance,
a federal statutory goal of consumer protection may coexist with goals
of environmental protection, energy efficiency, energy diversity, and
energy security. 28 But decisions that treat consumer protection as a
unitary ceiling value may hobble subnational efforts to pursue
coexisting goals, or result in an extra-statutory, judicially imposed
prioritization of goals. In any event, while some judicial
interpretations in energy law favor broad preemption and others
favor state and local decisions, courts addressing preemption in
energy statutes are rarely attentive to the variety of preemption tools
at their disposal. As an alternative to the conventional unitary
preemption approach in energy statutes, we advance floor
preemption as consistent with the history and structure of both the
1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"),2 9 and the
1935 Federal Power Act ("FPA"), 30 and as a good idea for energy
policy, especially in addressing clean energy issues.
In Part III, we consider the challenges and limitations of a
judicial presumption in favor of floor preemption in energy law, and
draw lessons for federalism issues arising from other complex
regulatory problems with multi-purpose statutes. One challenge
relates to the fact that the standards in many federal energy statutes
embrace multiple goals and are not as easily reduced to quantitative
standards as some environmental law standards are. Another
challenge arises from the prospect of parochial state or local decisionmaking in energy, which can lead to protectionist regulatory
27. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 184 (2006) ("[F]ederal preemption cuts short the
lawmaking process and products of an entire level of democratic government.").
28. Schapiro, supra note 25, at 837-38 ("Eliminating complementary state regulatory
schemes might contradict the congressional purpose to advance health and safety aims.").
29. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 15, 16, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
30. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 847 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).

1292

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

programs or undermine uniformity interests. While worthy of
recognition, we maintain that neither challenge renders floor
preemption inappropriate for clean energy and many other regulatory
problems.
Ultimately, we suggest courts and regulators need to pay careful
attention to the distinction between preemption's substance and its
implementation tools. At some level, assessment of preemption tools
is related to regulatory design, but their legal status often depends on
an analysis independent of the determinations related to the
substantive supremacy of statutes. We maintain that the statutory
interpretation inquiry for preemption tools such as regulatory floors
must consist of an implied preemption analysis that is attentive to the
statute or regulation's purposes. Particularly when Congress is silent
or ambiguous on the tools of preemption-as we maintain it has been
in many energy statutes-there will be room for a range of different
federalism approaches. With this in mind, we advance a workable
implied preemption framework for courts to determine, in the
absence of express congressional guidance, whether a preemption
floor fits certain regulatory problems without judicially imposing
substantive values on statutes.
The floor preemption approach we advance for clean energy has
lessons for federalism disputes in other contexts. As Heather Gerken
has recently observed, federal statutes deploy more-and more
nuanced-models of federalism than is often appreciated, and the
same statute may sometimes invoke multiple approaches to
federalism." We think this complementariness is especially true in the
energy context, where broad-based federal statutes amended over
seventy-five or more years are designed to serve multiple-and
sometimes conflicting-values. Such dovetailing likely applies to
other contexts, such as healthcare, as Abbe Gluck has identified. 32
Equally important, however, our approach does not define every
federal statute or regulatory program as endorsing a floor or as suited

31. See Gerken, supra note 15, at 1550-51.
32. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation:State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 539
(2012). Gluck observes that state authorities have a long history of "enacting state laws
and regulations, creating new state and local bureaucracies, and participating directly in
the federal regulatory process-all as part of their duties to implement federal statutes."
Id. at 538. She urges the need for legal doctrine addressing "how to allocate
implementation authority when Congress unquestionably has the power to regulate but
gives both state and federal implementers concurrent jurisdiction over the same federal
statutory terrain." Id. at 541.
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to a cooperative federalism approach.3 3 Often, we submit, subnational
regulation can serve some of the same values underlying the federal
statute-an approach that is reinforced by the history of energy
statutes and their overall structure and logic in addressing clean
energy issues. But where Congress makes a unitary supremacy choice
regarding a particular issue, it is incumbent on courts to respect it.
Only where Congress has failed to do so will a floor preemption tool
be appropriate. We offer some considerations to assist courts in
determining when Congress has made a unitary supremacy choice in
energy and other statutes.
I. PREEMPTION FLOORS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

We begin this Part by supplying some context for what we call
"preemption tools" in environmental law. As we argue in this Part,
preemption analysis in the environmental law context distinguishes
the substantive supremacy of federal statutes from the judiciallydetermined effects of supremacy. Indeed, although most
environmental statutes are clear in their purpose to advance some
basic goal, such as reducing pollution, protecting natural resources, or
minimizing environmental risks, this clarity has never meant that the
singular effect of preemption is national uniformity in environmental
standards and enforcement. Instead, many environmental statutes
establish a floor with respect to environmental standards or their
enforcement, allowing state and local governments to retain the
flexibility to pursue overlapping regulatory programs that reinforce
the same goals embodied in the federal law.
This Part provides several illustrations from the environmental
law setting that best exemplify floor preemption, explains why
Congress and courts have endorsed this preemption tool, and
describes when, in some limited instances, Congress has deviated
from it and adopted unitary standards. As discussed in this Part, the
judicial and agency approach to preemption in environmental law has
only favored unitary standards in instances where Congress makes an
explicit choice to preempt subnational regulation or where courts
invoking implied preemption doctrine have found that allowing

33. Similarly, Heather Gerken notes that multiple approaches to federalism are
reflected in current regulatory statutes, and that different approaches may even be
appropriate within the context of the same regulatory program. See Gerken, supra note 15,
at 1550 (observing that "[slubstantial variegation can be found within the same statutory
scheme").
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subnational regulation to continue would impose a clear conflict with,
or present an obstacle to, meeting a federal statutory goal.
CongressionalChoices to Adopt Regulatory Floors
Congress often expressly supersedes state regulatory authority
under its Supremacy Clause authority34 and has done so in a variety
of contexts including both energy and environmental regulation.
Expressly preemptive legislation is presumed to reflect Congress's
carefully deliberated view of state and federal roles, including the
specific regulatory manner in which ultimate decisions will be made.
For example, in the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), Congress explicitly
provided that federal standards would supersede state standards that
fell below a certain level." But importantly, this substantive
supremacy decision alone does not determine the effects of
preemption. Congress sometimes envisions the states taking on an
active role if they so choose. Thus, while setting minimum standards,
the CWA did not explicitly impose a unitary standard but instead
authorized states to set effluent limitations that are more stringent
than federal minimum standards and that pursue the same pollution
reduction goal.36 Under this scheme, widely considered a leading
A.

34. Article VI of the Constitution provides in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006).
36. See Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 510,33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1370 (2006). Section
1370 of 33 U.S.C. provides:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1)
preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate
agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of
pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution;
except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in effect under
this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt
or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less
stringent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under this
chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of
such States.
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example of cooperative federalism, states may enact regulations
compliant with the Clean Water Act and request authority for issuing
permits and enforcing their terms. 37 In the event a state fails or
declines to enforce federal or stricter-than-federal standards, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is required to enforce the
federal standards. 38
Another paradigm example of floor preemption in
environmental law is the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Under the CAA's
cooperative
federalism regime, states may adopt
state
implementation plans to reach the "national ambient air quality
standards" set by the EPA with respect to six "criteria pollutants."3
Section 116 of the CAA expressly permits states and their
subdivisions to set emissions standards or otherwise require air
pollution abatement, provided that the standards adopted are not less
stringent than federal standards.4 As with the Clean Water Act,
states retain the primary responsibility for permitting and for
enforcing their standards." In addition, states are expressly allowed
to adopt air emissions standards that are stricter than the minimum
national standards promulgated by the EPA.4 2 Congress adopted a

Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
37. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1977); Alexandra B.
Klass, Climate Change and Reassessing the "Right" Level of Government: A Response to
Bronin, 93 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 15, 25 (2009), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org
/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/KlassClimateChangepdf.
38. See Clean Water Act § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (2006). This is an
uncommon outcome, as the great majority of states prefer to regulate their own
environmental quality. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30030,
CLEAN WATER ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE LAW 4 (2010) (stating that the federal
government retains responsibility for Clean Water Act permitting only in Idaho,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and the District of Columbia).
39. § 109-110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (2006).
40. Id. § 116, § 7416 (addressing retention of state authority).
41. Id. § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (finding that air pollution control is within the
"primary responsibility" of the states); id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (requiring states to
submit state implementation plans outlining standards and enforcement mechanisms for
primary air quality standards).
42. See id. § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Except as otherwise provided in sections
1857c-10(c), (e), and (f) (as in effect before August 7, 1977), 7543, 7545(c)(4), and 7573 of
this title (preempting certain State regulation of moving sources) nothing in this chapter
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation plan or under
section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, such State or political subdivision may not adopt
or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or
limitation under such plan or section); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 844 &
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similar approach in section 3009 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), which provides that "no State or political
subdivision may impose any requirements less stringent than those
authorized under this subchapter respecting the same matter as
governed by such regulations."4 3
Yet another example of floor preemption in the context of
environmental regulation is the underground injection control regime
of the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA")." After the 1997
Eleventh Circuit case Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation v.
EPA,4 5 the SDWA governs the increasingly widespread practice of
hydraulic fracturing, whereby water and chemicals are injected into
the ground at high pressure to fracture shale rock and release natural
gas.46 As with several other federal environmental protection
schemes, the SDWA expressly envisions a leading role for the
states-in particular, the task of developing underground injection
control programs with standards at least as stringent as certain
minimum standards promulgated by the EPA.47
When Congress adopts floor preemption, it establishes a national
minimum standard in order to achieve a clearly identified
environmental protection goal. At the same time, Congress also
allows states substantial flexibility in their approaches to
implementation, and, sometimes, in their approaches to enforcement.
Experimentation at the subnational level can especially be helpful in
developing regulatory approaches for nascent technologies, such as
fracking. In contrast to floor preemption, Congress has on occasion
expressly favored a unitary federal approach rather than a floor in
adopting environmental statutes.
For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA") 48 contains a unitary standard for labeling or
packaging of pesticides: "[a] State shall not impose or continue in

n.2 (7th Cir. 1975) ("A state plan must meet the [federal] minimum criteria, but may
exceed them.").
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (Supp. V 2011).
45. 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997).
46. See id. at 1478 (holding that hydraulic fracturing is a form of underground
injection subject to EPA regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1469-70 ("A
state must submit to EPA a proposed [underground injection control] program that meets
these minimum requirements, and receive EPA approval, in order to obtain primary
regulatory and enforcement responsibility for underground injection activities within that
state.").
48. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 2010 & Pamphlet 2 Feb. 2013).
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effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under this Act." 9 Likewise, the 1987
amendments to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,50 known as
the National Appliance Efficiency and Conservation Act
("NAECA"),si empowered the Department of Energy to set unitary
efficiency standards as to twelve common household appliances.5 2
The current statute expressly provides that these standards preempt
any state regulation of the efficiency of the federally-regulated
appliances." Moreover, NAECA was enacted only after several
states had adopted appliance efficiency regulations; it thus eliminated
those preexisting state regulatory schemes.5 4
Under the Clean Air Act, federal regulators set uniform national
vehicle emission standards.5 However, in this unitary preemption
context, Congress envisioned some residual flexibility for the states:
California, and only California, is permitted to set its own heightened
standards, though other states may elect to adopt California's
standards. 6 Thus, with vehicle emissions standards, the federal floor
also acts as a federal ceiling, with the single exception that states have
the right to opt-in to California's higher standards. The unitary
"ceiling" component of this scheme avoids the complex and
expensive scenario in which vehicle manufacturers are compelled to
design vehicles to comply with up to fifty separate vehicle emissions
regimes. The "floor" component provides a limited opportunity for
those states whose constituents are so inclined to undertake the
increased costs of cleaner vehicles, in exchange for the perceived
environmental benefits." This scheme is widely considered a
49. Id. § 136v(b).
50. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 62016422).
51. Pub. L. No. 100-12, 101 Stat. 103 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6201-6422 and in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
52. Id. § 3, 101 Stat. at 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 6292 (2006)).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6297 (2006) ("[Ejffective on the effective date of an energy
conservation standard established in or prescribed under section 6295 of this title for any
covered product, no State regulation concerning the energy efficiency, energy use, or
water use of such covered product shall be effective with respect to such product .....
54. See, e.g., Carlson,supra note 5, at 66.
55. See Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006).
56. See id. §§ 177, 209(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §H 7507, 7543(e)(2)(B) (2006) (allowing
California to set its own vehicle emissions standards); Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J.
Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking Ground on Issues Other Than Global
Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 9-10 (2007), http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/v102/n2/1,029/LR102n2Watts&Wildermuth.pdf.
57. This has been described as a "lead alternative state" system. See David A. Dana,
Democratizingthe Law of FederalPreemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 507, 545-46 (2008).
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successful reconciliation of the need for uniformity with the desire for
regulatory innovation."
In sum, express floor preemption involves an explicit
congressional choice that state and local standards are allowed so
long as they are more protective of environmental goals than federal
standards, presumably because this advances the environmental
protection goals of the statute. At least in theory, express floor
preemption allows a minimum level of regulation sufficient to protect
the environmental quality of neighboring jurisdictions and provides
an option for states and localities so inclined to undertake the
additional cost of still better environmental quality. In instances
where Congress has favored uniformity over subnational flexibility, it
has expressly limited the array of subnational regulatory options, as
with FIFRA and NAECA, or has found ways to strike a balance
between state autonomy and industry compliance costs, as with
vehicle emissions standards.
B. Implied Preemption's Threat to Environmental Floors
Federal law is often construed by judicial or executive branch
officials to disempower the subnational regulators by implication,
despite the federal statute's silence on the issue. Within this so-called
"implied preemption," there is a basic taxonomy of preemption
theories, each defined by the specific rationale for preempting state
law. The Supreme Court has explained as follows:
Preemption occurs .. . when there is outright or actual
conflict between federal and state law, where compliance with
both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible,
where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state
regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively,
thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no
room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full objectives of Congress. 9
Thus, implied preemption is said to consist of "conflict
preemption," "field preemption," and "obstacle preemption." At the
extreme, some commentators question whether forms of implied
58. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kristen H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 183940 (2008) (noting that the EPA has occasionally adopted California's standards as national
standards).
59. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) (citations omitted).
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preemption are consistent with the Constitution at all,60 and others
have observed that these implied preemption decisions reflect the
political leanings of jurists more than congressional intent.6 1 Yet the
Supreme Court has long recognized the necessity of implied
preemption,62 including the ability of agencies to preempt state and
local authority. Commentators disagree over how readily implied
preemption should be triggered or how expansive it should be.' As a
doctrinal matter, courts uniformly maintain that congressional intent
is the "touchstone" of every preemption inquiry,6' but as in other
statutory interpretation contexts they routinely draw from the
traditional allocation of authority between levels of government and
pragmatic considerations to aid in their decisions.' The means of
answering the question whether a federal statute should displace state
law has surprising indeterminacy given its importance and the
frequency with which it arises.
Several judicial decisions have interpreted environmental
statutes to include unitary national standards not based on an explicit
choice by Congress, as express preemption doctrine would require,
but based on implied preemption doctrine. For example, in 1992 the
Supreme Court rejected an Illinois law regulating the training of
hazardous waste site workers as conflicting with the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act,67 using implied preemption
analysis to find unitary preemption.6 Lower courts have applied a
similar line of implied preemption reasoning to find unitary

60. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption,86 VA. L. REV. 225,304 (2000).
61. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of
Federal Preemption Jurisprudence:A QuantitativeAnalysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1159
(1999).
62. One voice of dissent on the Court in this regard is Justice Thomas. See Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I cannot join the majority's
implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines.").
63. See infra Part II.B.1.
64. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 58, at 1834 (arguing for a curtailed
application of preemption that would require either an express statement or a direct
conflict between state and federal law); Steven Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt
the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 53-54 (2005) (arguing that courts should only recognize
express preemption, and should abandon theories of implied preemption); Robert L
Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void Through Federal Preemption
by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 21 (2008) (arguing in favor of implied preemption
approach).
65. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58,66 (1987).
66. See Glicksman, supra note 64, at 35-36 (citing cases).
67. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. H§ 651-678,42 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006))
68. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108-09 (1992).
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preemption of state and local laws in the nuclear waste transport and
hazardous waste contexts.6 9 Such decisions presumably settle on
unitary preemption on the theory that a floor preemption approach
would present a conflict with a congressional goal in the relevant
area. Yet at the same time, these limited instances of implied unitary
preemption have involved clear federal goals related to managing
risks in nationwide economic activities, along with challenges to state
or local initiatives that conflict with or interfere with their
implementation.
By favoring unitary preemption instead of floor preemption, the
above decisions run against the grain of environmental law-and
there are strong precedential and pragmatic reasons that implied
unitary preemption has been limited to the most clear-cut instances of
conflict or obstacle with respect to federal programs. In
environmental contexts where Congress has adopted a clear
environmental protection goal but has been silent or ambiguous
regarding the form of preemption, the Supreme Court has
occasionally recognized unitary preemption on an implied
preemption analysis, but has been wary of extending that unitary
preemption expansively. For example, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,
Inc.," the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and held
that FIFRA's labeling requirements for herbicides, which had been
interpreted elsewhere to impose a ceiling for labeling activities,"
preempted state tort law claims.72 Observing that in FIFRA Congress
was silent regarding the status of state tort law, the Court confirmed
that FIFRA did preempt competing state labeling standards as well as
"any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a labeling
requirement that diverges from those set out in FIFRA and its
implementing regulations."7 3 Tort theories not requiring a company
74
to change its labeling, however, were held not to be preempted.

69. See Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986) (invalidating county
ordinance prohibiting storage, processing, and transport of acute hazardous waste because
it presented a conflict with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's minimum
standards); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1112-13 (3d
Cir. 1985) (finding township ordinance prohibiting the transport of nuclear waste
preempted by Atomic Energy Act, under field preemption, and Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, under obstacle preemption).
70. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49 (mentioning that this is an example of
express ceiling preemption).
72. Bates, 544 U.S. at 452, 454.
73. Id. at 452.
74. Id. at 431.
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The judiciary's reluctance to embrace implied preemption to set
unitary standards in interpreting environmental statutes reinforces
federalism values. Arguments in favor of floor preemption in
environmental regulation, even where Congress has not made an
explicit floor preemption choice itself, reflect a concern with selfdetermination, particularly in areas traditionally regulated by the
states (so-called "historic police powers" of the states)." This
rationale can be traced to Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.," in which
the Court recognized a presumption against preemption, stating,
"Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied... [s]o we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded. . . ."n This line of

reasoning underlies the notion that states should enjoy primacy in
regulating for matters like land use and health,78 although it may
extend to other areas where states can provide innovation.
In addition to arguments rooted in state sovereignty, as David
Adelman and Kirsten Engel,7 9 Ann Carlson,80 Bill Buzbee, 1 and Alex
Klass' have highlighted, there are practical arguments for generally
favoring floors over unitary ceilings in the context of environmental
statutes. That is, providing a minimal federal standard without
eliminating all state regulatory authority over standards and
enforcement can simply produce better regulation. In areas where a
diversity of approaches among states leaves inconsistent approaches
and results, such an approach ensures that all states overcome
fragmentation and move in a similar direction with respect to basic
policy goals. Floor preemption's multiplicity of regulators limits the
impact of the risks endemic to regulation, which include "regulatory

75. Schapiro, supra note 25, at 836-37.
76. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
77. Id. at 230.
78. See Buzbee, supra note 13, at 1560 & n.31, 1561 n.33 (collecting cases evidencing
"[j]udicial concerns with federal assertions of power impinging on ... state and local
domains... especially in the setting of federal environmental regulation"); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) ("States traditionally have had great
latitude under their police powers to legislate as 'to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.' " (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,62
(1872)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 58, at 1807-08.
80. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 281, 318 (2003).
81. See William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk
Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 147-48 (2007).
82. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State
Climate Change Efforts, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1677-78 (2008).

1302

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

inertia, capture, poor initial choice or error, outdated choices, and
inadequate funding of administrative agencies."83
In contrast, relying on a single federal regulator can amplify the
impact of those problems when they occur.' Relying on a single
federal agency might produce stagnation, especially where federal
regulators have limited resources and it is left unclear what
jurisdiction or tasks remain for subnational regulators. In such
instances, floor preemption can provide alternative regulatory
forums, help to curb agency capture," and create inter-jurisdictional
competition for better regulation."6 Ann Carlson has observed that an
"iterative federalism" approach can also promote innovation by
generating a wide array of regulatory models for the regulators in any
one subnational government to consider adopting." Finally, in
contrast to approaches that would leave jurisdiction uncertain, a floor
preemption model may help to overcome stalemates where neither
federal nor subnational regulators are inclined to act.
The argument that judges and agencies should favor floor
preemption over unitary approaches where Congress is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the form of preemption is bolstered by the
reality that Congress can always impose unitary national standards
through express preemptive language-and when Congress does so, a
court can dutifully respect this express preemption choice. A unitary
approach to preemption, consistent with ceiling preemption, can
promote uniformity and a one-size-fits-all solution, and Congress may
recognize this as important in contexts such as national product
markets. But in other environmental protection contexts, where
Congress has declined to expressly favor unitary standards, courts
83. Buzbee, supra note 81, at 155-56. This can be particularly important in instances
where regulation is addressing complex issues, and where subnational regulation provides
a context for overcoming difficult coordination problems. See Jody Freeman & Dan
Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 809-10 (2005) (noting how
institutional limitations on jurisdiction lead to barriers to solutions for environmental
problems).
84. See Buzbee, supra note 13, at 1556 ("[B]ecause floor preemption retains multiple
institutions and the different modalities and incentives of common law litigation, one need
not rely on hyper-involved citizens and selfless bureaucrats to prompt regulatory
reexamination and adjustment.").
85. See Alexandra B. Klass, State Standards for Nationwide Products Revisited:
Federalism, Green Building Codes and Appliance Efficiency Standards, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 335, 357 (2010).
86. See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When There Is an
"Emerging Consensus" of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 649,
656 (2008).
87. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalismand Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
1097, 1102-03 (2009).
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have rightly favored floor preemption as an approach consistent with
the design of federal environmental law statutes, and that gives states
flexibility to advance federal goals in their own regulatory decisions.
II. IDENTIFYING REGULATORY FLOORS IN FEDERAL
ENERGY STATUTES

Unlike environmental law, most judicial and academic
discussions of energy statutes conflate discussions of the substantive
supremacy of federal law with the selection of a particular
preemption tool such as a unitary standard. In this Part, we highlight
this defect and the impoverished notion of federalism it endorses for
energy law. We maintain that the interpretive approach to
preemption in energy statutes by courts and agencies should parallel
the approach to environmental statutes: absent clear evidence of a
congressional purpose to adopt unitary standards or an obvious
conflict or obstacle to a clearly defined regulatory program, courts
and agencies should generally favor floor preemption over ceiling
preemption in the context of energy statutes.
At the outset, it bears noting that, as with some environmental
standards, on occasion Congress has made explicit choices to adopt
unitary preemption in the energy context. For example, due to an
express choice of Congress, beginning with the first instance of
federal regulation of the natural gas industry in 1938, federal
regulators have enjoyed preemptive federal authority to issue
certificates of public convenience and necessity, authorizing the
construction of natural gas pipeline projects.' Such a certificate
makes federal eminent domain powers available to the applicant,
through a framework that prevails over conflicting state and local
law.89 As a more recent natural gas-related example, the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 provided the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") with exclusive federal authority to site
liquefied natural gas terminals. 0 In such contexts, Congress has

88. See Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 7, 52 Stat. 821, 825 (1938) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006)); see, e.g., Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 2 F.
Supp. 2d 106, 108-09 (D. Mass. 1998); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the
Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 333
(1994) ("FERC's plenary and preemptive power to authorize construction or expansion of
gas pipelines was critical to the success of the gas transition.").
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006).
90. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311(c)(2), 119 Stat. 594, 68586 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2006)) (granting FERC "the exclusive authority to
approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an
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favored a national regulator to avoid subnational regulatory solutions
that conflict with a federal goal.
While unitary preemption has an undeniable place in energy law,
in this Part we argue that many agency and judicial interpretations of
energy statutes seem to assume-mistakenly-that it is the only
available preemption tool for energy regulation. By contrast, we
maintain that the best interpretations of energy statutes such as
PURPA and the FPA are as providing for a floor with respect to
many issues, not imposing a unitary national ceiling-especially in
contexts where Congress has been unclear or ambiguous about
preemption tools. Where Congress has not made such an explicit
choice, major energy statutes such as PURPA and the FPA are often
more consistent with the floor preemption approach of environmental
law. The best understanding of these statutes is that they do not
embrace express unitary standards, nor do they provide a good basis
for a court to invoke an implied preemption analysis that discovers a
conflict or an obstacle to a national regulatory program. In fact, these
statutes contain flexible standards and multiple regulatory goals, and
envision substantial coextensive realms for national and subnational
regulation, and thus, like environmental law statutes, they are more
consistent with a floor preemption approach. As a result, absent
congressional intent to the contrary, or clear evidence of a conflict or
obstacle, the preemptive scope of these statutes should be understood
narrowly, and to favor floor preemption over unitary standards for
the energy sector-particularly in the area of clean energy.
A.

Clean Energy Floors in PURPA
PURPA is a key federal energy statute, and the extent of its
preemptive effect has proven to be an important question for
subnational clean energy policies. Adopted at a time when the United
States was paying close attention to the price of energy and to its
heavy dependence on oil imported from the Middle East, the key
provisions of PURPA work to encourage the development of
cogeneration 9t and certain renewable power generation projects.Y

LNG terminal"); AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 527 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir.
2008).
91. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 17 (D.C. Cir.
1999) ("A cogeneration plant produces not only electric power but also steam or other
thermal energy that can be used for various industrial or commercial purposes." (citing 16
U.S.C. § 796)).
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First, the statute authorized the Federal Power Commission to
exempt these so-called "Qualifying Facilities" ("QFs") from certain
strictures of the Federal Power Act and certain financial reporting
requirements under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of
193593 ("PUHCA"). 94 Second, as a financial incentive to encourage
the construction of QFs, PURPA required utilities to purchase the
electricity these facilities produce at the utility's "avoided cost" of
generating the electricity itself.95 These so-called "avoided cost" rates
are calculated by states. States have considerable discretion in how
they administer PURPA, and can implement the statute by "issuing
regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or by taking
any other action reasonably designed to give effect to FERC's
rules."" However, a state's determination of avoided costs is subject
to review by FERC.97
Like environmental standards, FERC's avoided cost
determinations raise the issue of the nature of preemption. Both
FERC and courts have considered different preemption approaches,
but floor preemption is the approach that is most consistent with
PURPA's goals and statutory framework. Indeed, both the Supreme
Court and FERC recognized as much early in PURPA's history.
Despite this cooperative federalism heritage, recent FERC decisions
have deviated from this path. Clean energy presents both FERC and
courts a propitious opportunity to reclaim PURPA's cooperative
federalism approach in addressing preemption, and preemption tools
will be important to their approach.

92. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(b) (2012) ("The primary energy source of the facility must
be biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources, or any combination
thereof, and 75 percent or more of the total energy input must be from these sources.").
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (2006) (repealed 2005).
94. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210(e), 92
Stat. 3117, 3145 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 824a-3 (2006)).
95. Id. § 210, 92 Stat. at 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006)) ("No
[rule establishing the price utilities pay qualifying facilities] shall provide for a rate which
exceeds the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.").
96. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982); Am. REF-FUEL Co. of
Hempstead, 47 FERC 1 61,161, at 61,533 (1989) ("[S]tates are allowed a wide degree of
latitude in establishing an implementation plan for section 210 of PURPA, as long as such
plans are consistent with our regulations. Similarly, with regard to review and enforcement
of avoided cost determinations under such implementation plans, we have said that our
role is generally limited to ensuring that the plans are consistent with section 210 of
PURPA....").
97. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 91
61,047, at 61,338 (2010).
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1. PURPA Background
PURPA may be the paradigmatic example of a federal energy
law enacted by Congress with multiple statutory purposes. The
turbulent historical context in which the statute was enacted provides
a helpful background for understanding these goals. Due to the 1973
Arab oil embargo, and to dysfunctional price regulation in the natural
gas industry,98 the 1970s witnessed "dramatic and severe shortages of
oil and natural gas and skyrocketing prices of almost every form of
energy."9 9 In the five years prior to PURPA's enactment, natural gas
and oil-which together accounted for about one third of the
electricity generation portfolio-had increased in cost by 175% and
400%, respectively. 100 These events brought energy policy to the
forefront of national politics and created unprecedented attention
and support for energy efficiency and conservation. Moreover,
environmental and safety concerns connected with nuclear power"o'
contributed to the urgency of increasing the use of alternative clean
energy sources of electric power.
PURPA's statutory text recognizes three goals: "conservation of
energy supplied by electric utilities"; "the optimization of the
efficiency of use of facilities and resources by electric utilities"; and
"equitable rates to electric consumers."0 2 Courts and commentators
have fleshed out these goals over PURPA's more than thirty years of
implementation.103 For instance, the avoided cost element of
PURPA's structure reflects a consumer protection objective. In
particular, it has been understood to reflect a goal of utility
indifference: that utilities should be economically indifferent in
98. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead
to Burnertip, 25 ENERGY L.J. 57, 65 (2004) ("Regulation of producer prices created the
acute gas shortage of the 1970s.").
99. See Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory
Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419,421 (1995).
100. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 195 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing S. REP. No.
95-361, at 32 (1977) and S. REP. No. 95-442, at 9 (1977)).
101. Cudahy, supra note 99, at 421 & n.15.
102. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (2006).
The present-day FERC counts five goals, adding two to the statute's original three:
developing hydroelectric power at existing small dams; and conserving natural gas while
maintaining equitable rates. What Is a Qualifying Facility?, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last visited Apr. 11 2013).
103. See, e.g., Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d
183, 185 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing PURPA as having been designed to "(1) encourage the
development of 'cogeneration' and 'small power production facilities' in order to'reduc[e]
the nation's reliance on oil and gas' and (2) promote renewable energy sources 'to combat
a nationwide energy crisis'" (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 306 F.3d
1264, 1266 (2d Cir. 2002))).
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choosing between purchasing electricity from a PURPA qualifying
facility, or generating such electricity itself." Along similar lines,
PURPA has also been characterized as seeking to induce
competition, 05 and that premise is supportable insofar as it plainly
encourages new entrants.' 06 Finally, commentators have described
PURPA as seeking to increase system reliability through the wide
dispersal of small generators,'07 as well as to encourage fuel source
diversity.1 0s
PURPA's multi-purpose nature is also evident in its provisions
that require state regulatory commissions to consider whether to
adopt a number of policies. While state commissions are required to
make a formal decision as to these policies,'09 their adoption is not
compelled, nor has the failure to adopt them been penalized."'o These
PURPA policies also yield insight into the goals of the federal statute.
Five such policies relate to the structure of electric rates"' and are
aimed at causing rates to better reflect the actual cost of generating
electricity at any given time, thus sending an appropriate price signal
to consumers (as opposed to deadening the price signal with a fixed
rate). For instance, PURPA section 111(d)(2) requires state
commissions to consider eliminating declining block pricing, under
which a utility would charge a customer less as consumption
increased.'
2. Recent Preemption Determinations Under PURPA
The extent of PURPA's preemptive effect has proven to be an
important question for subnational clean energy policies. The leading
case is FERC v. Mississippi,11 in which the Supreme Court rejected
104. Jim Rossi, Clean Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 243,252-53 (2011-12).

105. See Cudahy, supra note 99, at 425.
106. Until the 2005 Energy Policy Act amended the language of the statute, PURPA
required that a qualifying facility be "owned by a person not primarily engaged in the
generation or sale of electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration
facilities or small power production facilities)." 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(C)(ii) (2000)
(amended by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1253, 119 Stat. 594, 970
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(C) (2006))).
107. See Cudahy, supra note 99, at 427-28 ("If these [small dispersed] facilities provide
the same amount of power as a single large utility plant, the unfortunate possibility of a
big plant failure can be avoided.").
108. See id. at 420.
109. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (2006).
110. See id. § 112, 16 U.S.C. § 2622(c).
111. See id. § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(1)-(5).
112. Id. § 111, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(2).
113. 456 U.S. 742 (1981).

1308

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Mississippi's federalism-based facial challenges to the statute." 4 A
Mississippi U.S. district court had granted summary judgment in favor
of the state, holding in a strongly worded opinion that PURPA
exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers and that it offended
the Tenth Amendment by commandeering state regulatory
officials."s The Supreme Court reviewed this determination under a
now-repealed direct appeal procedure," 6 and held that PURPA was a
proper exercise of the commerce power." Then, the Court expressly
drew upon preemption theory in connection with rejecting
Mississippi's Tenth Amendment argument that its state utility
commissioners could not be compelled to consider PURPA's elective
policies."' The Court noted that Congress could have preempted the
entire field of electric utility regulation and opined that "PURPA
should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state
authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the
States to continue regulating in the area on the condition that they
[comply with PURPA]." 9
Despite the Supreme Court's endorsement of a cooperative
federalism approach, FERC has vacillated about the extent of the
statute's preemptive effect. PURPA expressly states that no FERC
rule regarding avoided cost determinations "shall provide for a rate
which exceeds the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative
electric energy."120 While this appears to endorse the idea that
avoided costs will impose a ceiling on state subsidies for energy
generated by QFs, this is only textually required to the extent that
FERC itself adopts rules allowing states to exceed avoided costs.
Early in the implementation of PURPA, FERC endorsed a
narrow view of the statute's preemptive effect. This left states a broad
range of prerogatives to encourage, through alternative means, the
same technologies that PURPA sought to promote. In the 1980s, in
its early regulations implementing PURPA's avoided cost rates, the
Commission explained as follows:
While the rules prescribed under section 210 of PURPA are
subject to the statutory parameters, the States are free, under
their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 745.
Id. at 752-53.
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1984) (repealed 1988).
FERC v. Mississippi,456 U.S. at 755-58.
Id. at 760-61.
Id. at 765.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2006).
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rates which would result in even greater encouragement of
these technologies.
....

If a State program were to provide that electric utilities

must purchase power from certain types of facilities, among
which are included "qualifying facilities," at a rate higher than
that provided by these rules, a qualifying facility might seek to
obtain the benefits of that State program. In such a case,
however, the higher rates would be based on State authority to
establish such rates, and not on the Commission's rules.'2 1
This approach nicely parallels the floor preemption approach in
environmental statutes, such as the CWA and CAA.122
But in 1995, while considering a Connecticut statute encouraging
solid waste plants, the Commission reversed its view of PURPA's
preemptive effect and rejected its prior analysis of a state's authority
to set incentive rates in excess of PURPA avoided costs, stating:
[T]he Commission did not provide any rationale to support [the
passage in the 1977 rule quoted above] or any legal analysis. We
cannot ascertain at this date any legal basis under which states
have independent authority to prescribe rates for sales by QFs
at wholesale that exceed the avoided cost cap contained in
PURPA. Moreover, for states to mandate rates above avoided
cost for a particular class of power suppliers (i.e., QFs) also runs
counter to Congress' and the Commission's current policies
which strongly favor competition among all bulk power
suppliers.
Henceforth, however, if parties are required by state law or
policy to sign contracts that reflect rates for OF sales at
wholesale that are in excess of avoided cost, those contracts will
be considered to be void ab initio.23
Thus, expressly relying on the "Commission's current
policies .. . strongly favor[ing] competition," 2 4 the Commission
struck down the Connecticut statute because it required Connecticut
121. Order No. 69,45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,221 (Feb. 25, 1980) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
292.304).
122. For discussion, see supra Part I.A.
123. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC 91
61,012, at 61,029 (1995). For a fuller
discussion of the Commission's reversal position in Connecticut Light & Power Co., see

Scorr

HEMPLING ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ENERGY
PRICES IN STATE-LEVEL FEED-IN TARIFFS: FEDERAL LAW CONSTRAINTS AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 33-35 (2010), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10ostil47408.pdf.

124. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC at 61,029.
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utilities to purchase electricity from certain waste-to-energy plants at
a rate exceeding the utilities' avoided costs. 125 Since that 1995
Connecticut Light & Power Co. proceeding, PURPA has been
understood to invalidate subnational policies that result in rates
exceeding the utility's avoided cost.126 This approach treats avoided
costs as reflecting a unitary standard that has a preemptive effect over
state policies, insofar as avoided costs are a ceiling on incentive rates
that states may wish to allow clean energy facilities to charge.
This approach-treating PURPA's avoided costs as a ceiling on
state-mandated incentive rates in order to advance consumer
protection purposes-has not clearly been required by judicial
decisions. Courts considering the preemptive effect of the avoided
cost standard have not ruled on whether states can require a utility to
pay favored generation sources more than the utility's avoided costs.
In Independent Energy Producers, Inc. v. California Public Utilities
Commission,'2 7 the Ninth Circuit reviewed California rules
implementing PURPA, which allowed utilities to dock their payments
to QFs by twenty percent if the QF did not comply with certain
operating and efficiency standards to advance clean energy goals.12 8
The court rejected this procedure, concluding that "the [California]
program is preempted by PURPA insofar as it authorizes the Utilities
to determine that a QF is not in compliance with. . . operating and
efficiency standards and to impose a reduced avoided cost rate on
that QF."'29 This Ninth Circuit decision resulted in rejection of a state
effort to allow utilities to pay less than avoided cost. However, the
court left open the question whether utilities can be compelled by a
state to pay more than their avoided cost. Still, to the extent that the
Ninth Circuit treated PURPA's avoided cost language as requiring
the setting of rates by both federal and state regulators on the very
same terms, it may be interpreted as endorsing the idea of a
preemption ceiling in the determination of avoided costs.
FERC itself seems to have adopted this unitary standard
approach in avoided cost determinations, and a recent FERC ruling
arising from a California clean energy policy illustrates its significance
for state clean energy policies generally.'s California had enacted
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Midwest Power Sys., 78 FERC 1 61,067, at 61,244 (1997).
127. 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. at 852.
129. Id. at 859.
130. A feed-in tariff is broadly defined by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
as follows:
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feed-in tariff legislation, A.B. 1613,13' which directed the California
Public Utility Commission ("CPUC") to promulgate the details of a
state-administered feed-in tariff for combined heat and power
("CHP") and renewable facilities.13 2 However, affected utilities
complained that California had exceeded its authority by requiring
them to pay for power from these facilities at a rate that was more
than their avoided costs.' The CPUC applied to FERC for a
declaratory order to the effect that the California feed-in tariff was
not preempted by PURPA or the Federal Power Act.134 FERC sided
with the complaining utilities rather than the state of California.' As
to PURPA, FERC construed the statute to preempt any state feed-in
tariffs mandating that utilities pay prices that exceed the avoided cost
under PURPA,136 consistent with its position in Connecticut Light &
Power Co. The FERC viewed itself as confined to this result, because
if the feed-in tariff beneficiaries were to operate outside of PURPA,
they would then be selling energy for resale, and this would bring
them within another statute FERC is charged to implement, the FPA
(addressed in greater detail below)."' In all, FERC's approach
treated PURPA avoided costs as a statutory ceiling on California
feed-in-tariffs.
Although FERC's decision on California's feed-in tariff was
largely mitigated by an order on motions for clarification as described
below, the ruling effectively caps state and local feed-in tariffs at
[A] publicly available, legal document, promulgated by a state utility regulatory
commission or through legislation, which obligates an electric distribution utility to
purchase electricity from an eligible renewable energy seller at specified prices (set
sufficiently high to attract to the state the types and quantities of renewable energy
desired by the state) for a specified duration; and which, conversely, entitles the
seller to sell to the utility, at those prices for that duration, without the seller
needing to obtain additional regulatory permission.
HEMPLING ET AL., supra note 123, at iv-v.
131. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2840-2845 (2013). A.B. 1613 prescribed ten-year
contracts at advantageous rates for renewable and cogeneration plants under twenty
megawatts. Elec. Regulation Comm., Energy Bar Ass'n, Report of the Electricity
Regulation Committee, 32 ENERGY L. J. 265, 316 (2011).
132. Elec. Regulation Comm., supra note 131, at 316.
133. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 61,047, at 61,326 (2010).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 61,337-38.
136. Id. at 61,338.
137. Id. ("Any CHP generator that is not a QF but is a public utility must, pursuant to
section 205 of the FPA file with the Commission the rates it proposes to charge under the
CPUC's AB 1613 tariff, and, consistent with section 205 of the FPA, the CHP generator
must demonstrate that such rates are just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.").
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PURPA's avoided costs and brings compliance with that cap within
FERC's regulatory purview.' 8 It reflects an approach to preemption
that is more in line with ceiling preemption and a unitary federal
standard for utility rates under PURPA than a floor preemption
approach.
3. Reclaiming PURPA's Clean Energy Floor
FERC's decision on California's feed-in tariff and its prior
decisions in the same vein risk extending PURPA's preemptive reach
to a length that is not required or even envisioned by the statute.
Initially, PURPA does not even direct that any state-administered
feed-in tariff needs to operate under the auspices of the federal
statute. 3 9 The rationale is that such a state policy could operate
entirely independently of PURPA, as FERC appreciated shortly after
the statute was enacted.' 40 Indeed, California's feed-in tariff program
did not limit its beneficiaries to facilities eligible for QF status under
PURPA.
The reason that a strong unitary preemption approach was not
envisioned by PURPA is grounded in the statute's multi-purpose
nature. Treating PURPA's avoided cost measure as a ceiling
prioritizes the goal of consumer protection, but inhibits state and
local policies designed to further other statutory goals of PURPA.
California's feed-in tariff for renewable power, for example, acted to
advance several of the goals of the PURPA statute. It encouraged
small renewable and combined-heat-and-power facility development,
and in encouraging such small facilities, it also supported distributed
generation and fuel source diversity. It also eased new market entry
138. Rossi, supra note 104, at 250-51 (noting that FERC's orders are premised on the
principle that any feed-in tariff power buyback price above FERC-approved avoided cost
is prohibited by PURPA).
139. See Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC 1 61,012, at 61,023 (1995) ("[I]f the
facility addressed by the Connecticut statute is not a QF and the seller is not a public
utility.. . this Commission does not have jurisdiction over its rates.").
140. See id.; see also Stanley A. Martin, Problems with PURPA: The Need for State
Legislation to Encourage Cogeneration and Small Power Production,11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 149, 171 n.199, 202 (1983). Martin explains:
There is an argument being advanced that PURPA has preempted the states from
setting higher rate standards. The majority opinion in [FERC v. Mississippi] seems
to counter this argument. Justice Blackmun made two references to Congress'
ability to preempt the field to encourage cogeneration and small power
production, but he also implied that Congress had not preempted the states from
enacting laws similar to PURPA.
Id. at 171 n.199.
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and thereby increased competition. Indeed, it could be argued that
the California feed-in tariff went a long way toward advancing many
of PURPA's goals. Thus, FERC's decision could be viewed as
elevating a consumer protection goal above the other purposes of the
statute-and unnecessarily so, given PURPA's flexible language.
Even after FERC's decision, with any state and local feed-in
tariffs decidedly subject to the PURPA statute and FERC's oversight,
one can envision an interpretation of PURPA that would not treat
PURPA's avoided cost provision as a unitary federal ceiling, and that
would allow for a floor preemption allocation of authority in the feedin tariff context. Indeed, the Commission itself recognized this
residual opportunity in its order on rehearing. The Commission
explained that a state could calculate a utility's avoided cost under
PURPA to include costs related to the environmental attributes of
the electricity it would otherwise need to purchase. 14 1 FERC
explained,
[Jiust as a state may take into account the cost of the next
marginal unit of generation, so as well the state may take into
account obligations imposed by the state that, for example,
utilities purchase energy from particular sources of
energy .... Therefore, the CPUC may take into account actual
procurement requirements, and resulting costs, imposed on

utilities in California."1

42

Thus, while states may not include an explicit "adder" for clean
energy, they theoretically may recognize, in their calculation of the
utility's avoided cost, the relatively greater value to the utility of
renewable energy.143
PURPA's allocation of responsibility for calculating avoided
cost-whereby the state calculates the rate in the first instance,
subject to FERC oversight if challenged-readily lends itself to the
familiar floor preemption of environmental law. A state or locality
interested in promoting clean energy may be able to do so by
accounting for the additional expenses of environmental benefits in
the avoided cost calculation. One author has observed that in a state
like California with an aggressive renewable portfolio standard

141. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 133 FERC [ 61,059, at 61,267-68 (2010).
142. Id. at 61,266 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 61,267-68.
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("RPS"), 1 " it would be fair to presume in setting avoided costs that
the marginal generation that the utility avoids by purchasing from the
OF would be not just any generation-but specifically renewable
generation. 145 In this way, a state or locality inclined to support clean
energy could effectively enact a feed-in tariff "floor," as long as it can
point to an ambitious RPS as its basis for generous avoided cost rates.
Federal regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act
could also establish the foundation for a state's presumption that a
utility's avoided cost is that of renewable generation, 14 6 and states that
elect to enforce supra-federal emissions standards in that context
could again use those heightened standards as a basis for a relatively
more generous avoided cost rate for renewables.
Another potential method of creating a floor preemption scheme
under PURPA is through renewable energy credit ("REC")
programs (also called "green tag" programs). Under such a program,
a renewable generator is awarded a tradable REC for each increment
of renewable electricity it produces and sells. 147 The subnational
regulator may require utilities or other businesses to acquire such
RECs, or companies may elect to do so voluntarily.'4 8 Thus, a
renewable generator that is also a PURPA OF will enjoy both the
avoided cost rate associated with the sale and the value of the REC. 149
The Commission has recognized the separateness of avoided cost
PURPA compensation and value derived from RECs,1s' thus clearing
the way for states to enact REC programs to encourage renewable
generation. In like vein, FERC has also allowed states to set PURPA
rates at above avoided cost if the utility is compensated through tax
credits."'1
In sum, FERC's interpretation of PURPA's avoided cost
requirement imposes a preemptive federal ceiling to preclude certain
state and local clean energy regulations such as feed-in tariffs, except

144. A "Renewable Portfolio Standard" as used in this Article refers to a state regime
that purports to require utilities, and possibly other power suppliers, to derive a particular
proportion of their electricity from specified renewable resources.
145. See David Yaffe, Are State Renewable Feed-in Tariff Initiatives Truly Throttled by
FederalStatutes After the FERC CaliforniaDecision?, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2010, at 9, 1416.
146. Id. at 15-16.
147. See HEMPLING ET AL., supra note 123, at 14-15.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 14.
150. Am. Ref. Fuel Co., 105 FERC 61,004, at 61,007 (2003).
151. CGE Fulton, L.L.C., 70 FERC 61,290, at 61,844 (1995); see HEMPLING ET AL.,
supra note 123, at 16.
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under narrow circumstances. However, PURPA is a statute designed
to serve multiple energy regulatory purposes, and can also assume a
floor preemption role, accommodating state and local policies that
seek to promote the goals of the statute other than consumer
protection. Which preemption role the statute will take is in the hands
of FERC in the first instance, and ultimately the courts, but the best
interpretation of the statute is a floor preemption approach-not a
ceiling or unitary standard approach that FERC has occasionally
endorsed.
B.

Extending Clean Energy Floors to the FederalPower Act

Unlike PURPA, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a
cooperative federalism statute in its original design,152 Congress was
not clear regarding the form of preemption tools in Part II of the
FPA.s 3 Because the FPA is a pervasive price-regulation regime, the
way courts approach the preemption effects of the FPA will be the
most important test of whether floor preemption is at home in the
context of subnational clean energy policies, and energy law
generally.5 4 In a number of areas, such as the determination of rates
for wholesale power sales, the FPA gave FERC jurisdiction to
152. See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text (discussing FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1981)).
153. The provisions of Part I of the FPA concern hydroelectric power, and are
peripheral to our discussion. Part I of the FPA has also given rise to numerous preemption
decisions. See, e.g., Albany Eng'g Corp. v. FERC, 548 F.3d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
("Our review of the text and legislative history of the FPA generally and § 10(f)
specifically convinces us that [FPA] § 10(f) must, in order to accomplish the full objectives
of Congress, be understood to preempt all state orders of assessment for headwater
benefits."). However, these decisions are largely confined to hydroelectric matters, and
they do not help us explain the preemption tools we highlight in this Article. When we
reference the "FPA," we refer to Part II.
154. Of course, in numerous of the preemption rulings in energy law, Part II of the
FPA has already been the statute at issue. See, e.g., Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 49 (2003) (holding as preempted a Louisiana Public Service
Commission order that impermissibly "trapped," or prohibited a utility from recovering,
certain costs for which FERC had approved utility's recovery); New York v. FERC, 535
U.S. 1, 4-5 (2002) (upholding FERC's determination in Order No. 888 to preempt state
regulation of unbundled retail transmission); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487
U.S. 354, 370 (1988) (holding that FERC's approval of cost allocation for a nuclear facility
precluded a subsequent state review and reallocation based on the "prudence" of the
decision to build the facility); Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co. 295
F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing as preempted by federal law certain state tort
claims against utility companies, because such tort claims would allow claimants to "obtain
state law money damages allegedly resulting from the operation of an interstate electricity
intertie expressly approved by FERC").
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determine electricity prices, a regulatory decision that inevitably has
some preemptive impact on state regulators, but, as has always been
recognized, does not entirely displace the authority of states in
regulating utilities. The conventional judicial approach to interpreting
the FPA embraces a unitary standard preemption approach, which
treats FERC-determined prices under the FPA as preempting any
subnational efforts to set wholesale power prices. We maintain that
this conventional approach to preemption tools is misguidedly
simplistic, and that the history and structure of the FPA favor an
alternative approach-energy federalism-that allows the use of floor
preemption tools.
1. FPA Background
The common lay perception may be that electricity is a single
"good," but in fact the regulation of electricity recognizes multiple
constituent services that are bundled together in the delivery of
electricity to the end consumer. These services include power
generation, frequently referred to as supply or the "wholesale" sale of
energy; transmission, which is the long distance transportation of
electricity over high voltage lines; and "retail" distribution, which is
the delivery of energy to end-use customers, at a customer-friendly
voltage, using smaller, radial lines. Historically, states largely
regulated distribution and retail issues related to power generation,
and approved the costs of generation, transmission, and distribution
to customers in bundled rates. Against the backdrop of this
traditional regulatory role, much of which preceded adoption of Part
II of the FPA in 1935, the most significant jurisdictional components
of the FPA speak to federal authority over the sale of energy at
wholesale and electric power transmission.
The statutory provision responsible for the historically sweeping
federal influence on the interstate electric industry is FPA section
205, which provides that the rates for power subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction must be "just and reasonable," and that
rates that fail to meet this standard are unlawful. 5 5 Further, rates
must not "grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or
subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage.""15 The
Commission is responsible for defining these standards, subject to
judicial review. The "just and reasonable" price standard extends
federal regulation to every wholesale sale of electricity that is
155. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006).
156. Id. § 824d(b).
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recognized to be in interstate commerce."' Although throughout the
twentieth century and up until the present day most state
commissions have regulated retail rates and guaranteed a return on
the utilities' prudent investments, 58 courts have extended the reach of
federal jurisdiction over energy sales to any contract and tariff terms
that can influence the wholesale price of electricity."' Thus, although
states retain the jurisdiction to set the retail rates that local utilities
can charge, section 205 along with section 201 means that virtually
anytime the state-jurisdictional utility purchases power from another
entity, the price will be subject to federal price regulation. Federal
price regulation extends pervasively throughout the electric power
industry.
Part II of the FPA was enacted in 1935, a time when power was
produced and delivered by vertically integrated local monopolies. For
many years section 205 was not particularly important to federal
energy policy: state regulatory authorities bundled the price of
transmission into retail rates, most transmission issues were handled
through bilateral contracts between neighboring utilities, and
interstate markets were largely isolated. Since 1935, electricity
markets have become vastly larger and more complex, and interstate
transactions are an indispensable feature of the provision of power.
Moreover, subsequent amendments to the FPA expanded federal
authority to provide adequate transmission for interstate markets in
electric power.160 Consequently, today the federal government's reach
to address transmission issues is one of the most litigated issues
related to federalism in the energy industry.'6 '
157. See id. § 824a(d).
158. See, e.g., New York, 535 U.S. at 5.
159. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. FERC, 832 F.2d 1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting
that FERC may consider evidence of retail price squeeze in setting wholesale rates); Cities
of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1984); City of Kirkwood v. Union
Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1178 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that states do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over retail rates where price squeeze is alleged); Anaheim v. FERC, 669 F.2d
799, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding FERC has authority to allow wholesale cost recovery of
losses stemming from anticompetitive retail conduct).
160. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-16
(amending FPA section 211, 16 U.S.C. § 824j, to allow the Commission to require a
transmitting utility to provide transmission services to another utility); Energy Policy Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1241, 119 Stat. 594, 961-62 (2005) (adding a new section 219
to the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824s, allowing the Commission to award incentive rates for
transmission projects on a case-by-case basis).
161. See generally Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Judge Cudahy and the Deference
Tension in U.S. Energy Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 371 (2012) (discussing litigation
involving transmission issues in the context of Judge Cudahy's approach to decisionmaking).
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As with PURPA, any preemption analysis of the FPA must
begin with some understanding of Congress's goals in passing the
statute. The conventional account of the significance of the FPA,
what we will call the "consumer populism" account, is that the statute
(in particular its "just and reasonable" standard) reflects an effort by
a New Deal Congress to protect consumers from monopoly abuses by
utilities by keeping rates as low as possible.'"2 Consumer populism is
consonant with early twentieth century utility regulation's focus on
keeping rates as low as possible to protect consumers." Bundled
retail rates at the state level largely emphasized this purpose.
Protecting consumers was also a major purpose that Congress
endorsed when legislating at the height of the New Deal in the
original Part II of the FPA.1' Moreover, in 1935, political and
financial abuses of the electric utility holding companies of the early
American electric industry were only a recent memory, 65 and in the
context of a severe financial depression, consumer protection was a
foremost concern. Federal regulators continued to emphasize the goal
of preserving low rates to protect consumers in the early years of the
FPA's implementation, including in expanding rural access to electric
power, accommodating post-World War II economic expansion, and
building out an interstate electric infrastructure to accommodate new
technologies such as nuclear power. Part I of the FPA, which
regulated hydropower, also endorsed a low rate goal fifteen years
before Part II was adopted.' 6
162. See David Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power,53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 141-43 (2012).
163. See RICHARD HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 9-28 (1999)
(discussing development of the "utility consensus" of cost of service regulation during the
progressive era, which appealed to consumer protection stakeholders through a guarantee
of low rates).
164. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1973) ("There is
nothing in the legislative history which reveals a purpose to insulate electric power
companies from the operation of the antitrust laws. To the contrary, the history of Part II
of the Federal Power Act indicates an overriding policy of maintaining competition to the
maximum extent possible consistent with the public interest.").
165. See HIRSH, supra note 163, at 9-31; HAROLD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY:
ELECTRICITY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 41-50 (1991)
(discussing the corruption of government-business relationships and the consolidation of
power in public utility holding companies in Chicago); Richard D. Cudahy & William D.
Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of
Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35,36 (2005).
166. For discussion of FPA's low rate goal, which included a specific statutory goal
apart from "just and reasonable" rates for preference power for municipal and
cooperative utilities, see Robert R. Nordhaus, Yardstick Competition in a Deregulated
Electric Industry, 12 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 256, 257 (Spring 1998). Notably, Congress chose
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In terms of its preemptive effect, the consumer populism account
of the FPA favors using the supremacy of federal law to limit the
prices that states can authorize firms to charge, in order to reinforce
the goal of protecting consumers from monopoly abuses. This
approach sees the FPA as setting a ceiling on prices, or as adopting
"just and reasonable" rates as a unitary preemption standard."16 Most
federal cases interpreting the FPA reinforce this approach. For
example, a well-established principle in the case law interpreting the
FPA holds that just and reasonable wholesale rates approved by
FERC must be passed through by state regulators, so long as the
wholesale transaction is prudent. Known as the "filed rate doctrine,"
this ceiling preemption approach was originally designed to protect
monopolistic price
consumers against
interstate railroad
which draws on an
doctrine,
discrimination.' Under the filed rate
implied preemption analysis, FERC's traditional cost-based rate
setting under Part II of the FPA (adopted during the New Deal) has
been recognized by courts as preempting state regulators from setting
prices that depart from a FERC-approved rate. For example, in
9 the U.S. Supreme
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,16
Court noted that the approval of a filed rate by FERC precludes state
regulators from determining that the rate is unreasonable. 17 0 The
Court grounded this doctrine in "Congress' desire to give FERC
plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that
the States do not interfere with this authority."' 71 Recent decisions
have broadened this implied preemption analysis even further to
recognize that FERC's policy of favoring competitive wholesale
markets preempts state and local pricing initiatives that exceed just

this kind of low rate and preference language in some statutes, such as Part I of the FPA,
with respect to federal utilities such as TVA, and with respect to projects such a Niagara
Redevelopment Act, but Congress did not include it in the portions of the FPA that
regulate the wholesale rates for all electric utilities.
167. The nature of this standard highlights the significance of framing preemption tools
such as floors and ceilings in energy law. Preemption floors may sometimes be reframed as
ceilings, but in many instances doing so requires rewriting the goals of a statute. See infra
notes 251-52 and accompanying text for discussion of this concern in the context of the
FPA.
168. Rossi, supra note 19, at 1598-1605.
169, 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
170. Id. at 966.
171. Id. Interestingly, many circuit courts and FERC have recognized an exception to
this doctrine that would allow a state to deny a utility the opportunity to recover costs
incurred as the result of buying power at the FERC-established wholesale rate if the
specific purchase, apart from the rate itself, is deemed imprudent by state regulators. See
Rossi, supranote 19, at 1607.
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and reasonable rates.12 This approach treats just and reasonable rates
under the FPA as a unitary ceiling on wholesale prices.
2. Preemption Under the FPA: The "Attleboro Gap" and the
FPA's Energy Federalism Framework
The unitary preemption standard reinforced by the consumer
populist account of the FPA's purpose overlooks that the framework
Congress put in place in Part II of FPA in 1935 was designed to
address a broad set of concerns related to federalism in energy
regulation. The concept of energy federalism that we introduced
above offers an alternative account of the FPA's purposes and
framework, holding that Congress's original design in the FPA was
not limited to consumer populism and a price ceiling approach, but
instead established a framework for the articulation of national
energy goals and their implementation by states, given variations in
geographic circumstances. Assessing the statute against the backdrop
of energy law at the time of the statute's adoption supports this
broader interpretation of the FPA as an energy federalism framework
statute. In addition, as we argue below, Congress has consistently
endorsed the energy federalism approach to the FPA in amending the
FPA since 1978, addressing important new concerns in the energy
industry like reliability, energy security, efficiency, and conservation.
Congress's recent amendments to the FPA elevate these new
concerns as goals of the FPA, just as consumer populism may have
been elevated at the time of the New Deal.
Even at the time of the FPA's adoption in 1935, Congress was
concerned with the statute's federalism implications. Congress
envisioned expanding national power to address state conflicts that
are at odds with federal goals, but doing so without completely
displacing state regulation. Prior to adoption of the FPA in 1935, state
commissions were powerless to regulate any interstate transactions by
utilities. The Supreme Court made this explicit in Public Utilities
Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.113 In
that case, Rhode Island's Narragansett Electric Lighting Company
had entered into a twenty-year contract to supply the full electricity
172. See Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042,1045-48, 105659 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding wholesale market set rates approved by FERC preempt the
California Governor's effort to protect consumers against strategic manipulation of
California's deregulated power market); Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202
F.3d 408, 419 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (addressing market-based rates approved
by FERC under the filed rate doctrine).

173. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
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requirements of the Massachusetts-based Attleboro Steam and
Electric Company.17 4 The parties filed the contract rate with the
Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island.' Several years later,
Narragansett obtained a rate increase from the Rhode Island PUC,
After the rate hike was appealed
over Attleboro's objections.'
through the Rhode Island courts, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The Court described the problems that could arise from
price regulation exclusively at the state level:
[I]f Rhode Island could place a direct burden upon the
interstate business of the Narragansett Company because this
would result in indirect benefit to the customers of the
Narragansett Company in Rhode Island, Massachusetts could,
by parity of reasoning, reduce the rates on such interstate
business in order to benefit the customers of the Attleboro
Company in that State, who would have, in the aggregate, an
interest in the interstate rate correlative to that of the
customers of the Narragansett Company in Rhode Island."'
It ruled that the rate between Narragansett and Attleboro
"is ... not subject to regulation by either of the two States in the guise

of protection to their respective local interests; but, if such regulation
is required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested
in Congress.""'
Thus, the Supreme Court disqualified both Massachusetts and
Rhode Island from regulating pricing terms of the electricity contract,
leaving any regulation of such prices to a federal regime that did not
yet exist because Congress had not yet legislated to regulate this kind
of interstate commerce. Notwithstanding the consumer populism
concerns described above, this so-called "Attleboro gap," whereby
neither the exporting state nor the importing state could regulate the
pricing of electricity sold across state lines, was the immediate
impetus for the 1935 amendments to the FPA.7 9
While the expansive implied preemption reach of filed rate
doctrine cases seems to endorse a strong consumer populism account

174. Id. at 84.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 85-86.
177. Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 90.
178. Id.
179. See Duke Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 401 F.2d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
("[I]t was primarily to fill the 'Attleboro gap' that Congress . .. passed the Federal Power
Act as its first exertion of national authority over the operating electric utilities."
(footnotes omitted)).
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of the FPA's purpose, an alternative way of understanding these and
other preemption cases is that courts are identifying the goals of the
FPA and applying it as an energy federalism framework statute.
These cases have established the basic principle of ensuring that
federal energy policy is consistent with and preserves the ability of
state regulators to protect customers in their jurisdictions, but they
also recognize that the FPA has evolved to address a diverse range of
energy goals and is no longer focused solely on consumer populism, if
it ever was. Thus, although many courts have interpreted the FPA as
endorsing ceiling preemption in the electric industry under the filed
rate doctrine, even in setting rates the statute does not necessarily
preclude a floor preemption approach to clean energy policies.
The preemptive effect of the FPA will continue to be a topic of
litigation in coming years, and given recent electricity market
developments, the question will have considerable importance for
subnational clean energy policies. Specifically, the FPA's "just and
reasonable" rate standard extends to electricity transactions
conducted over Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"),
including the price of electric power transmission, a service that is
essential to ensuring reliability and power supply diversity, including
the integration of renewable resources.'s These RTOs have been
established at the Commission's urging 81 over approximately the last
ten years to facilitate greater competition by breaking up the
vertically integrated nature of the electric industry. RTOs encourage
greater competition in electricity generation by separating it from
transmission, which is believed to be a natural monopoly for which
competition will never be practical. RTO participants surrender

180. RTO decisions affecting wholesale prices must be filed with FERC under the
FPA, and FERC applies the existing statutory principles including the "just and
reasonable" rate standard. See Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65
Fed. Reg. 810, 812 n.5 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also generally Ill.
Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009) (reviewing reasonableness of
the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland's ("PJM") RTO rates that had been approved by
FERC). FERC decisions are reviewed in the federal courts of appeals. See, e.g., id. at 473
(reviewing a determination by PJM). In this sense, RTO rules are backed by federal
authority, and unlike states and localities, do not have native authority that can be
"preempted." We acknowledge that agency and judicial decisions rejecting RTO rules are
not "preemption" decisions within the traditional legal meaning of the term. Nevertheless,
we adopt a broadened understanding of "preemption" to encompass agency and judicial
rejection of RTO rules, on the rationale that a decision of a non-federal, regional entity
with regulatory authority is being rejected under federal law.
181. See Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 810
(stating that the Commission was "amending its regulations under the [FPAJ to advance
the formation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)").
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control of their transmission facilities to the RTO, which allocates
access to transmission neutrally among generators, without
preference to the transmission owner's generation. With important
exceptions, these formally voluntary RTOs have been successful, and
they now administer energy transmission over broad swaths of the
country.
The recent Seventh Circuit case Illinois Commerce Commission
v. FERC82 ("ICC") is a prime example of the potential preemptive
impact of the Federal Power Act on RTOs, if federal courts take a
unitary standard approach consistent with preemption ceilings rather
than floors. ICC illustrates how a consumer populism interpretation
of the FPA can limit the autonomy of non-federal regulators to
address transmission pricing, in contrast to an energy federalism
approach that is consistent with preemption floors, which would
enhance the authority of subnational regulators to address
transmission pricing. In ICC, the court of appeals reversed the
Commission's approval of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
("PJM") RTO's method of allocating the costs of high-voltage
transmission system upgrades among participating utilities.' PJM's
methodology was simply to allocate the project cost pro rata among
the PJM participants, with the rationale that high-voltage projects
increase system-wide reliability and thereby benefit the entire system,
even though they will not directly provide service to many PJM
customers.' 84 In a decision written by Judge Posner, a Seventh Circuit
panel rejected this reasoning as overly facile, and charged the
Commission with ensuring that the costs imposed on any customer
must be at least "roughly commensurate" with benefits.'

182. 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009).
183. Id. at 474,478.
184. Id. at 474.
185. Id. at 477. Judge Posner referenced the FPA in explaining the majority ruling, and
did find that FERC lacked any authority under the FPA to approve the rates. Id. at 476
("FERC is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme that requires a group of utilities to
pay for facilities from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in
relation to the costs sought to be shifted to its members."). Yet Judge Posner's decision
also appears to impose a heavier reasoning requirement on FERC. The court seemed as
dissatisfied with the Commission's lack of explanation for the approach that it took to
allocating costs as with the substantive approach the Commission took to allocating costs.
See id. at 477 ("[W]e are not authorized to uphold a regulatory decision that is not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or to supply reasons for the
decision that did not occur to the regulators." (citations omitted)). Still, the court required
the Commission to reconsider the process by which it satisfies itself that RTOs rates are
"just and reasonable." Id. at 478. This suggests that at a minimum, how courts are
interpreting the FPA can even inform their application of arbitrary and capricious
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Such approaches to reviewing agency policy choices against the
backdrop of the FPA will continue to have significance for energy
policy and renewable energy. In FERC's landmark Order 1000,16
issued in 2011, FERC gave RTOs heightened responsibility for
regional planning, including the construction of new transmission
lines.' Included in this mandate was the express mandate for RTOs
to "consider" state policies in their regional planning processesincluding, importantly, state renewable portfolio standards.' This is
an important potential expansion of RTO authority by FERC
because, prior to Order 1000, RTOs did not enjoy the specific
authority to plan transmission development to accommodate
increased reliance on renewable energy, and transmission
construction simply turned on what was requested by new generators
or planned by utilities."' Now, however, RTOs are responsible for
developing plans for new transmission construction that account for
state renewables policies.19" RTO decisions on how to spread the costs
of such new transmission lines will significantly affect the economics
of renewables projects.
Given the courts' willingness to reject electricity market planning
under the pervasive FPA price ceiling regulation regime, reinforced
by the filed rate doctrine, RTOs must ensure that their regional
planning processes do not run afoul of the FPA. After the ICC case,
RTOs must ensure that the costs of new transmission projects are
allocated in a manner "roughly commensurate" with their benefits.
RTOs have new responsibility to facilitate state clean energy policies
as described above, but courts have set the precedent for striking
down RTO plans against the backdrop of the FPA. Therefore, the
success of state clean energy policies could foreseeably be affected by
whether courts endorse a consumer populism interpretation of the
FPA, or recognize a broader energy federalism approach.

principles to FERC's policy decisions regarding transmission and its planning, siting, and
pricing.
186. See Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35 (2012)).
187. Id. at 49,851.
188. Id. at 49,873.

189. Id. at 48,957 n.72 ("PJM acknowledges in its comments that under its existing
transmission planning process, it cannot build transmission to anticipate the development
of future generation, including renewable energy resources, that are not associated with
specific generator interconnection requests.").
190. See id. at 49,845.
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3. Identifying Clean Energy Floors in the FPA
While a ceiling preemption approach gives federal regulators the
ability to cap power prices, a rigid ceiling preemption approach is not
consistent with the federalism framework Congress put in place in the
FPA. By limiting rates to only prices that FERC has approved, a
ceiling approach to the filed rate doctrine precludes state and other
subnational regulators from setting rates that depart from the filed
rate, even if those rates advance other goals that are consistent with
federal law. The energy federalism framework of the FPA does not
require this outcome unless the exclusive or primary goal of the FPA
is considered to be maintaining low energy prices to protect
consumers. Moreover, when assessed in the context of recent energy
pricing policies, energy federalism reveals a new opportunity for
preemption analysis under the FPA for courts to open up space for
policy experimentation in the energy sector. If, in contrast to the
consumer populism account, the FPA is instead understood as a
framework statute like PURPA that endorses multiple goals, the
statute is consistent with a preemption floor rather than a ceiling. We
believe that there is a place for floor preemption in interpreting the
FPA because the FPA's "just and reasonable" standard need not be
construed as a unitary federal "ceiling" in all contexts.
The legislative history of the FPA does not direct a unitary
preemption interpretation, nor do later acts of Congress or later
judicial interpretations. Evaluating the intent of the FPA's drafters
presents a problem familiar to other statutory contexts: considering
the intent of the authors as to matters that were inconceivable at the
time of the statute's enactment. For example, it is impossible to know
what the drafters of the FPA would have thought of nuclear power in
1935, or of modern state and local clean energy initiatives. What is
clear, however, is that they did not enact the FPA solely to keep
power prices low. Instead, they enacted it to reach places that state
regulation could not-i.e., to bridge the Attleboro gap.191 Indeed,
191. For instance, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
summarized the Act's purpose as follows:
The new parts are designed to meet the situation which has been created by
the recent rapid growth of electric utilities along interstate lines. The percentage of
electric energy generated in the United States that was transmitted across State
lines increased from 10.7 in 1928 to 17.8 in 1933.... Under the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in [Attleboro], the rates charged in interstate
wholesale transactions may not be regulated by the States. Part II gives the
Federal Power Commission jurisdiction to regulate these rates.
H.R. REP. No. 74-1318, at 7-8 (1935).
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preservation of the states' regulatory authority to experiment and
adapt to regional circumstances was an important issue when the bill
was under consideration, and its legislative history reflects this. A
contemporary House of Representatives report on the bill asserted,
"Probably, no bill in recent years has so recognized the
responsibilities of State regulatory commissions as does title II of this
bill."' 92 The legislature also placed broadly limiting hortatory
language into the Act itself. For example, section 201 states, "Federal
regulation of matters relating to ... the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce . . is necessary in the public interest,
such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the States." 1 3
As to the FPA's actual application, despite judicial decisions
applying the filed rate doctrine that emphasize the FPA as a ceiling
on wholesale rates, the statute has never been construed to require
that electricity be produced and sold at the lowest possible price, and
the plain language of the FPA obviously does not compel such an
interpretation. Notably, Congress can make that requirement explicit
when it wishes, as it did as early as 1915 in the Niagara Power Project
Act'94 and in the power preferences for municipal utilities and
cooperatives buying power from federally-operated hydro projects. 195
For example, Congress prescribed rates governing the sale of
hydropower produced at dams operated by the Army Corps of
Engineers several years after Part II of the FPA was adopted, in the
1944 Flood Control Act.196 Such energy was to be marketed by the
Secretary of the Interior, and now, by the Department of Energy
through four Federal Power Marketing Administrations, at the
"lowest

possible

rates ... consistent

with

sound

business

principles." 9 1
192. Id. at 8.

193. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006).
194. Niagara Power Project Act, Pub. L. No. 85-159, § 1, 71 Stat. 401, 401 (1957)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 836 (2006)) (providing that "project power shall be
available for sale and distribution primarily for the benefit of the people as consumers,
particularly domestic and rural consumers, to whom such power shall be made available at
the lowest rates reasonably possible and in such manner as to encourage the widest
possible use").
195. See Clinton A. Vince & Nancy A. Wodka, Recent Legal Developments and
Legislative Trends in Federal Preference Power Marketing, 7 ENERGY L.J. 1, 7, 62-63
(1986) (discussing Bonneville Power Authority and other federal project "preference
power" rates).
196. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16, 33, and 43 U.S.C.).
197. Flood Control Act of 1944 § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 825s (2006).
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In stark contrast, the term "just and reasonable" is self-evidently
subjective and capable of meaning different things under different
circumstances. The Supreme Court made this clear in NRG Power
Marketing v. Maine Public Utility Commission." NRG involved the
New England Independent System Operator's ("NE-ISO") attempts
to establish a regional market for energy capacity.199 While most of
the interested parties were satisfied with NE-ISO's market design,
some were not.2 U Six entities challenged the agreement establishing
the NE-ISO market. 20 1 The complainants focused in particular on the
agreement's invocation of the "Mobile-Sierra" doctrine,2 02 which,
when applicable, means that a contract may only be set aside if the
rate is so extreme as to injure the "public interest." The NRG
complainants argued that they should not have to meet that higher
"public interest" burden of proof if they challenge rates set under the
NE-ISO market, because they refused to enter into the agreement
from the beginning. 203
In ruling against the complainants, the NRG majority rejected
the notion that the FPA involves multiple standards of review. 204
Rather, there is one standard, "just and reasonable," but it means
different things in different contexts.205 In the context of a rate set in a
private agreement between energy market participants, the party
challenging the justness and reasonableness of the rate has a higher
hurdle than in other circumstances; under Mobile-Sierra,it must show
that the rate is so unreasonable as to be contrary to the "public
interest."" However, this higher bar is simply what is "just and
reasonable" in that context.

198. 130 S. Ct. 693 (2010).
199. Id. at 697. "Capacity," in the energy market context, is the right to call on energy,
as opposed to energy itself. See Blumenthal v. FERC, 552 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
200. NRG Power Mktg., 130 S. Ct. at 697.
201. Id. at 698.
202. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine refers to two Supreme Court cases decided on the
same day, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956) and
Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 34 (1956). NRG Power
Mktg., 130 S. Ct. at 698.
203. NRG Power Mktg., 130 S.Ct. at 696, 700.
204. Id. at 700.
205. Id. ("[T]he public interest standard is not, as the D.C. Circuit presented it, a
standard independent of, and sometimes at odds with, the 'just and reasonable
standard' .. . rather, the public interest standard defines 'what it means for a rate to satisfy
the just-and-reasonable standard in the contract context.' " (quoting Morgan Stanley
Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 546 (2008))).
206. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 527 (citations omitted).
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On remand from NRG, the Commission understood the Court's
language to mean that there is "a broad continuum of approaches
[that can be employed] to meet the statute's requirement that
rates... be just and reasonable."2 0 The Commission further
explained, "Given the flexibility inherent in the statutory 'just and
reasonable' standard, the Commission may require varying types and
degrees of justification for challenges to particular rates or practices,
depending on the circumstances."208 Thus, as NRG illustrates, there is
no obvious reason that state and local policy priorities-like RPSscould not be considered in the inquiry as to whether a rate (or an
RTO's cost-allocation proposal for a new transmission line), is "just
and reasonable" under the FPA.
A floor preemption approach consistent with the FPA as an
energy federalism statute, rather than focused on the exclusive goal of
consumer populism, is reinforced by changes to the industry, as well
as by regulatory and statutory developments since 1935. The
preemptive reach of the FPA has gained its current importance not
because the law has changed, but because in the years since 1935, the
electric industry has become an increasingly regional, interstate
enterprise. As described above, the FPA will reach virtually any
transaction conducted through the increasingly prevalent medium of
an RTO.209 But this intervening industry evolution is an unsatisfactory
justification for preempting state and local clean energy policies.
Given Congress's focus on retaining state regulatory authority, the
authors of the Act would have been bemused to see the FPA upend
state and local regulatory initiatives.
Even though, as a matter of history, consumer populism once
comprised a major goal of Part II of the FPA, FERC's regulation of
electric power under the FPA should be viewed as no longer solely
concerned with protecting consumers. Instead, over time the
regulatory contract has expanded beyond incumbent utilities and

207. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC 161,208, at 62,043-44 (2011).
208. Id. at 62,044-45.
209. RTOs are approved and overseen by FERC, and they administer multi-state
markets in transmission, and often also energy and capacity markets. See ISO/RTO
COUNCIL, 2009 STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT 5, 24-27 (2009), http://www.isorto.org/
atf/cf/{5B4E85C6-7EAC-40AO-8DC3-003829518EBD}/2009%20IRC%2OState%20of%20
Markets %20Report.pdf. There has been no challenge of which the authors are aware to
the notion that transactions conducted through RTOs are transactions in interstate
commerce.
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their customers.2 10 State regulators have endorsed the incorporation
of broader values into the regulatory contract's "just and reasonable"
standard (or the equivalent state standard), including public interest
goals such as environmental protection, efficiency, and
conservation. 2 11 FERC itself recognized the evolving regulatory
contract by shifting in favor of deregulation and competition in the
1990s, in particular through the introduction of wholesale
competition,21 2 which has allowed new entrants in the industry to
proliferate.
Congress's own enactments reinforce the incorporation of these
broader goals. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA"),21" which was specifically designed to authorize agencies
such as the Atomic Energy Commission (the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's predecessor) to consider environmental impacts of
their decisions (an authority that at least some agencies claimed they
previously lacked),2 14 can also be viewed as directing federal
210. See generally JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW (2005)
(developing the argument that the terms of the regulatory compact have shifted beyond a
bilateral firm-consumer contract).
211. As the historian Richard Hirsh describes it, fundamental shifts have occurred in
the "utility consensus" behind price regulation at the state level, increasingly recognizing
environmental and conservation values as well as traditional consumer protection goals in
the implementation of state law, even where the applicable statute was not updated by the
legislature. See HIRSH, supra note 163, at 268. An important innovation in this regard is
state adoption of conservation policies such as time-of-day rates and demand-side
management, and incorporation of the costs of these into just and reasonable rates. For
further discussion of how these goals are included in state statutes, see generally Michael
Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions (2006),
7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) (reviewing the statutory authority of state public utility
commissions to consider environmentally significant issues in regulating utility
companies); cf Jeremy Knee, Article, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental
Impacts and the "Public Interest," 113 W. VA. L. REV. 739 (2011) (explaining that although
state regulators should take environmental considerations into account in their decisionmaking and some have done so, many utility regulators have not taken this step in a
meaningful fashion).
212. Wholesale competition and regulation of wholesale markets became an official
FERC policy in 1996, when the Agency issued its landmark Order No. 888, Promoting
Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
35,385).
213. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006),
amended by Lake Pontchartrain Basin Restoration Program, Pub. L. No. 112-237, 126
Stat. 1628 (2012).
214. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding AEC compliance rules inadequate under
NEPA). As Judge Skelly Wright observed in his Calvert Cliffs opinion, the responsibility
of the Agency "is not simply to sit back, like an umpire, and resolve adversary contentions
at the hearing stage" but instead "it must itself take the initiative of considering
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regulators to shift away from an exclusive focus on consumer
protection. Beyond NEPA, which does not change any agency's
substantive authority, in the past forty years the FPA has also been
amended on multiple occasions to address goals much broader than
consumer protection, such as energy security and conservation.2 15
Statutes with a more particular focus, such as PURPA, amended
the FPA to authorize FERC to bring an even broader range of goals
into play. With respect to FERC's authority over power supply, as is
discussed above, PURPA amended the FPA to give FERC new
authority over the pricing of certain energy sales related to efficiency
and conservation.216 With respect to transmission, PURPA added
FPA sections 211 and 212 to address interconnection and reliability, 217
and these provisions were later amended in 1992 to expand federal
authority to mandate transmission access.218 In 2005, Congress added
sections 215 and 216 to the FPA to allow FERC backstop preemption
authority to site transmission lines where states lacked either the
authority or wherewithal to do so on their own.
While no one doubts that the FPA gave FERC extensive
authority to protect consumers, the addition of amendments and new
statutes reflects new values such that the FPA's "just and reasonable"

environmental values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the process beyond
the staff's evaluation and recommendation." Id. at 1119. While later cases retreat from the
aggressive enforcement of NEPA Judge Wright endorsed in Calvert Cliffs, the basic legal
principle that NEPA expands the values that an agency can consider in making its decision
remains valid. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the
National Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 104-05 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds.,
2005).
215. For instance, PURPA was actually a series of amendments to the FPA, and it
added conservation values to the FPA regime. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006)).
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contained FPA amendments designed to enhance energy
security. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1211(a), 119 Stat. 594, 94146 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2006)) (providing for the establishment of a reliability
entity to promulgate standards concerning cybersecurity, among other things); id.
824
p (2006)) (providing for the
§ 1221(a), 119 Stat. at 946-51 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
United States Department of Energy to designate transmission congestion corridors where
"the designation would enhance national defense and homeland security").
216. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210, 92 Stat. at 3144 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006)).
217. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 §§ 203-04, 16 U.S.C. 0 824j, 824k
(2006).
218. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, §§ 721, 722, 106 Stat. at 2915-16
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §H 824j, 824k (2006)).
219. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1221, 119 Stat. at 946 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p
(2006)).
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mandate is properly viewed as having evolved beyond the narrow
New Deal notion that regulators are solely concerned with protecting
the customers of a utility from monopolistic abuses." Where, as in
the case of the FPA today, a statute endorses a range of goals without
clearly favoring one, preemption ceilings are generally not an
effective means of advancing the statute's values since they limit the
ability of regulators to balance goals in implementing the statute.
In sum, regardless of whether consumer populism was one of the
purposes of the FPA as originally adopted, it was not an exclusive
purpose, nor is it the primary purpose given the way that energy
statutes have evolved. The energy federalism framework Congress
originally adopted in Part II of the FPA allows energy law to adapt to
multiple goals, and Congress has emphasized these other goals in its
subsequent enactments. In this sense, the FPA has continued to play
a significant role in providing federal regulators the ability to
articulate federal goals and the flexibility to coordinate state
experiments that adapt those goals to regional needs and
circumstances-an approach that is consistent with how cooperative
federalism statutes such as PURPA, as well as many environmental
statutes, are interpreted.
4. Examples of Possible Floor Preemption in the FPA
The scope of preemptive federal authority over many energy
issues seems pervasive as a result of several age-old statutory regimes,
coupled with the far reach of Congress's Commerce Clause authority
in the energy industry. Congress has often addressed energy
regulation in the form of broad energy "mega-statutes," featuring
numerous compromises and addressing a host of related and
unrelated issues that have arisen since Congress's last energy
legislation. In these statutes, Congress has rarely prescribed

220. PURPA is certainly not the only other statute of relevance to FERC in regulating
wholesale electricity prices. Apart from procedural statutes, such as NEPA, other energy
statutes with which the Agency must comply (many of which have been incorporated into
provisions of the FPA through amendments and new sections) include the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 16, 22, 26, 30, and 42 U.S.C.) (amending and adding provisions of the FPA);
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 16, 25, 26, 30, and 42 U.S.C.) (amending and adding various
provisions to the FPA); Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495,
100 Stat. 1243 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (amending various
provisions of the FPA); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (restricting the
development of new power plants powered by oil and natural gas).
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regulatory regimes so thorough as to occupy the field in any
particular area. Considerable authority over issues including electric
power regulation and fracking remains in the hands of state and local
regulators. Adding to this issue is a federalism lag, as Congress revises
federal energy laws-including agency jurisdiction and goals-only
infrequently and incompletely.
Moreover, as with any other legislation, mega-statutes can fail to
accomplish their intended effect as a result of unfavorable treatment
in the courts. For instance, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, to
address a widely recognized shortage of new electric transmission
construction, Congress gave FERC a new authority to issue federal
permits to build electric transmission lines where states failed to issue
the necessary permits-so-called "backstop" siting authority. 221
Aspects of FERC's implementation of its backstop siting authority
were challenged, and the two resulting appellate court decisions
greatly cabined FERC's authority and then deferred its use for
years.222 Thus, absent additional congressional action, a regulatory
adjustment that Congress considered to have been necessary in 2005
will go unrealized.22 3
The lack of congressional corrections to such judicial
interpretations should not be surprising. Congress has shown itself
particularly ineffective in passing energy legislation to address climate
change and to promote clean and renewable energy. For example,
federal legislators have tried but repeatedly failed to enact climate

221. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1221(a), 119 Stat. at 946-51 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824p(b)(2006)). For a superb defense of this approach to preempting state and local
siting decisions as a type of cooperative federalism program, see generally R. Seth Davis,
Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative
Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404 (2008)
(engaging in this discussion).
222. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095-96 (9th
Cir. 2011) (requiring the Department of Energy to prepare a new Congestion Study-a
precursor to the siting of transmission lines-for failure to consult with affected states);
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 324-25 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that even
after passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC does not have the authority to site
transmission lines when state has denied the permit within the statutory one year period).
223. See, e.g., Sandeep Vaheeshan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in
Power,49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 87, 123-29 (2012) (arguing that Congress must ultimately
act to substantively preempt state and local decisions regarding the siting of transmission
lines); cf Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 289, 289 (2011) (advocating a less intrusive process preemption approach for
transmission siting, whereby Congress would impose procedural constraints on state and
local siting processes).
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change legislation and renewable portfolio standards. 224 The federal
wind power production tax credit, critical for wind developers to
obtain tax equity financing and largely credited with the prodigious
growth of wind power in recent years, is in constant risk of being
discontinued.2 Despite little organized opposition to this tax credit
program, Congress has repeatedly declined to make it permanent.2 26
Consequently, its extension into future years is revisited annually, and
wind power projects are condemned to being financed and developed
in fits and starts. 2 27 Today, few would assert that comprehensive
climate change legislation is likely to be passed by Congress in the
near future.
In marked contrast to federal congressional inaction, many states
and other subnational authorities have displayed impressive
enthusiasm and ingenuity in energy regulation, particularly in
addressing climate change and promoting clean energy. State and
local governments have become leaders on a variety of fronts,
adopting standards and goals for renewable energy,2 28 setting building
standards, 2 29 and giving priority to a number of other innovative and

224. The most famous example of this effort in recent years was the passage of the
Waxman-Markey Climate Change Bill by the U.S. House of Representatives. See
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2998, 111th Cong. (2009). For
discussion of some of the interest group impediments to climate change legislation related
to the energy sector, see Jim Rossi, The PoliticalEconomy of Energy and Its Implications
for Climate Change Legislation,84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 404-27 (2009).
225. See Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), DATABASE OF ST.
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (DSIRE), http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive Code=US13F&re=1&ee=1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013)
(describing the history of the enactments extending the production tax credit).
226. See id.
227. Production Tax Creditfor Renewable Energy, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.ucsusa.org/clean -energy/smart-energy-solutions/increaserenewables/production-tax-credit-for.html ("Lapses in the PTC ... cause a dramatic
slowdown in the implementation of planned wind projects and layoffs at wind companies
and manufacturing facilities. Upon restoration, the wind power industry takes time to
regain its footing, and then experiences strong growth until the tax credits expire. And so
on.").
228. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1357-64 (2010) (discussing dozens of approaches to RPSs among the
states); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market The Impact of a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the US. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49,
61-62 (2008) (discussing various state RPS approaches).
229. See, e.g., Thomas Hutton, Toward Better and More Uniform Building Efficiency
Codes, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 129-44 (2010) (discussing the potential role of building
codes as a mechanism to address climate change and describing the diversity of state
approaches to implementing such standards).
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"adaptive" climate change initiatives.2 30 In this respect, the states are
once again giving substance to Justice Brandeis's timeless account of
states as "laboratories of democracy." 3 ' But whatever the virtues of
state and local innovation, it will be fruitless to the extent that federal
law preempts it. Floor preemption in the context of the FPA provides
an opportunity for such innovation to flourish in ways that advance
national energy goals, especially in the context of clean energy issues
such as transmission, demand response (explained in greater detail
below), and conservation policies.
a.

An FPA Clean Energy Floorfor Transmission Cost
Allocation
Consider electric power transmission line cost allocation. While
the Seventh Circuit panel opinion in ICC will be a serious new
challenge to the efforts of subnational entities to spread the costs of
new transmission projects for clean energy, 232 a dissent by Judge
Cudahy hints at the more flexible approach that the energy
federalism interpretation of the FPA would allow. In contrast to
Judge Posner's emphasis on cost causation as a way of determining
just and reasonable rates consistent with the consumer populism goal
of the FPA, Judge Cudahy reasoned:
[I]t is not possible to realistically determine for each utility and
with reference to each major project the likelihood that ratesimplification will reduce litigation, or to calculate the precise
value of not having to cover the costs of power failures and of
not paying costs associated with congestion, and all this over
the next forty to fifty years. Concerns about the real value to
individual utilities of the stability and efficiency provided by
improvements to the backbone grid are answered by their
voluntary participation in the power pool and its collaborative
"RTEP" (or regional transmission expansion planning) process.
Rate-making based on cost causation is assured by this process,
since universal cost-sharing is recommended only when

230. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 58, at 1846-49 (discussing various state
climate change initiatives).
231. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
232. See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Posner's panel
opinion).
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developments are found to benefit the integrated system as a
whole.233
He observed that imposing a precise quantification of benefits, or
even rough proportionality, is inconsistent with past practice in
regional grid pricing to address issues such as cascading outages and is
not required by any of FERC's rules or precedents or the statutory
language of the FPA.234 Judge Cudahy's approach is consistent with
understanding the FPA as an energy federalism statute to the extent
that it recognizes that the just and reasonable standard incorporates a
broader range of values, including goals related to reliability and
preserving the integrity of the system-wide grid as a whole. In this
sense, the approach Judge Cudahy endorsed in his dissent envisions
the FPA's just and reasonable standard as a floor designed to allow
subnational (i.e., RTO) differentiation in pricing approaches, rather
than as a ceiling that limits pricing and cost allocation innovations.2 s
The judicial approach to preemption under the FPA will decide
the fate of important new initiatives for the energy industry, including
Order 1000. The Commission could conceivably take a permissive
view of what is "just and reasonable" in connection with the costs of
building transmission to access renewables, by adopting a broad
understanding of who benefits from those projects. Indeed, in
approving the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator's
("MISO") transmission tariff in 2011, FERC adopted an approach to
spreading costs similar to that at issue in the ICC case, although
MISO made efforts to better explain how those bearing the costs
would benefit from the lines.236 On the other hand, if a narrow
understanding of the "beneficiaries" of that transmission is adopted
by FERC and the courts, RTO efforts to spread the costs of building
transmission necessary to reach far-flung renewable resources in
order to satisfy the clean energy policy of one or more states could be
rejected as impermissible under the ICC ruling. Thus, state clean

233. 111. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470,479 (7th Cir. 2009).
234. Id. at 480-82.
235. Id. at 481 ("The big picture here is that FERC's proposal to spread the cost of
very high voltage transmission [within the region] ... seems to me in the interest of
efficient, high-capacity transfer capability and of the closely linked improvement of
reliability which affects the system generally.").
236. We think that this approach thus likely meets even the standard endorsed by
Judge Posner in the ICC case. For another view that highlights the significance of the
preemption issue in this context, see Gabe Maser, Note, It's Electric, but FERC's CostCausation Boogie-Woogie Fails to Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission,
100 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1853 (2012).
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energy policies and RTO autonomy would be stymied under the just
and reasonable standard.
b. An FPA Clean Energy Floorfor Feed-In Tariffs
A floor preemption approach to the FPA would also open up
more opportunities for feed-in tariffs as another important form of
state and local experimentation in clean energy policy. FERC's feedin-tariffs order, discussed above in connection with PURPA, also
found preemption for larger scale renewable projects under the
FPA's just and reasonable standard."' This determination certainly
would not have been required under a floor preemption approach. In
this sense, the FPA might even be seen as consistent with state and
local efforts to promote and subsidize renewable energy, not as a limit
on them.3
c. An FPA Clean Energy Floorfor Demand Response
Yet another important pricing issue on the horizon for national
clean energy policy whose fate may depend on how preemption is
approached is so-called "demand response," or efforts to reduce the
consumption of electricity by reinforcing incentives for customers to
purchase less. 239 FERC has recently adopted an innovative set of new

237. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 61,047, at 61,337 (2010).
238. Another way of recognizing a floor preemption approach to the Federal Power
Act is to find that it does not apply to a transaction. For example, in Sun Edison LLC, 129
FERC 61,146, at 61,146 (2009), a solar power company petitioned for a declaratory
order to the effect its rooftop solar installations need not comply with the FPA. See id. The
company explained that its business model involved installing and owning rooftop solar
panels, and selling the electricity to the customer owning the building. Id. While the great
majority of its installations only offset, and never exceeded, the building's total electric
needs, occasionally the output of some installations would exceed the building's load, and
would be contributed into the electric system of the local utility under the applicable net
metering system. Id. at 61,619. This "sale for resale"-from SunEdison, to a customer, to
the local utility-could be viewed as a wholesale electricity transaction subjecting
SunEdison to the federal price oversight of the FPA. However, citing to existing
precedent, the Commission agreed with SunEdison that a sale for resale under the
auspices of a state net metering program will not implicate the FPA so long as the
customer's net metering proceeds do not exceed the customer's charges in any billing
period. Id. at 61,620-21. Thus, the Commission has observed a gap within the FPA's
sweeping preemption to allow for state net metering programs to encourage small thirdparty installations.
239. A natural incentive to consume less electricity exists in the avoidance of the
purchase price for whatever increment is foregone. Demand response programs
supplement that existing incentive.
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policies regarding demand response.240 FERC's demand response
rules are highly complex, but at their core they set out to create
incentives in the pricing of electric power that actually reduce the
consumption of electricity, including the possibility that firms could
be compensated not to purchase electricity in wholesale markets.2 4 1
Much like a new transmission line, demand response can alleviate
congestion and provide reliability benefits to the entire system. 2 42 It
also can advance values associated with conservation and
environmental protection, insofar as reductions in demand may allow
plants to operate at more efficient levels, or make the construction of
new facilities unnecessary.243 Given the enormous opportunity
demand response presents to reduce demand and change investment
decisions about new power plants and transmission lines, FERC
Chairman Jon Wellinghoff has described demand response as the
"killer app for the smart grid." 244
However, for FERC's new demand response approach to survive
legal challenges, the Commission will likely need to depend on an
expansive interpretation of the goals of the FPA as including not only
consumer protection, but also reliability, conservation, and
environmental goals.245 Moreover, if FERC's demand response
pricing rules are interpreted as a ceiling under the FPA, state and
local conservation approaches that require utilities to make
conservation-minded decisions in procuring wholesale power could
be preempted if they require utilities to pay more than the rates

240. See generally Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy
Markets, Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(providing market rules for demand response in organized wholesale energy markets).
241. Id. at 16,666.
242. Id.
243. Some environmental law scholars have begun to recognize the significance of
reducing demand and changing consumption patterns in advancing environmental goals.
See John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change:
Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 144-56 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh &
Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-NeutralIndividual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1687-95
(2007).
244. Wellinghoff. FERC CreatingMarket for DR, the 'Killer App', SMARTGRIDTODAY
(June 20, 2010), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/articles/wellinghoff-ferc-creating-marketfor-dr-the-killer-app-1?v=preview; see Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing
the Importance of Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market
Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J. 389,393-96 (2007).
245. Although to date many conservation policies related to pricing, such as demandside management, have been adopted by state regulators, in fact there is a long-standing
foundation in federal statutes for conservation policies as well. See generally James W.
Moeller, Electric Demand-Side Management Under Federal Law, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J 57
(1993) (discussing the history of federal demand-side management).
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FERC has approved for avoided consumption. For example, a stateapproved plan to reward utility conservation that leads it to reduce its
purchases and participation in the wholesale market, especially where
the costs exceed the proportional payment plan FERC has approved
in its demand response rules, runs afoul of the FPA if FERC's rates
are considered a ceiling. But it is hard to see how such a plan presents
an obstacle to federal goals of promoting efficiency, conservation, and
energy independence under the FPA. A unitary preemption approach
will limit the ability of states and localities to reward utilities for their
conservation practices and to innovate in other conservation
measures. 46 By contrast, treating FERC's demand response policies
as a preemption floor would encourage state and other subnational
regulators to innovate.
d.

The Implications of an FPA Clean Energy Floorson Federal
Subsidies
In addition to promoting innovation, floor preemption in statutes
such as the FPA helps to reduce overreliance on federal subsidies in
promoting renewable and clean energy and to encourage the use of
subnational subsidies over federal programs. If financial incentives
for renewable projects run afoul of a unitary "just and reasonable"
ceiling under the FPA, it steers the primary responsibility for clean
energy subsidies toward the federal government. This can preclude
local or regional allocation of project costs by regulators closest to
those who stand to benefit the most from these projects. Another
unintended result of expanding federal authority may be overreliance
on federal tax breaks and subsidies as the primary vehicle for
promoting investments in clean energy. 247 By contrast, clean energy
floors provide an opportunity to better distribute the risks of clean
energy investments geographically-focusing on those jurisdictions
whose constituencies want to undertake the cost and risk of clean
energy policies in exchange for the perceived benefits. Subnational
entities such as cities, states and regional institutions are much better
suited than federal regulators to adapt investments to specific

246. Although it preceded FERC's actual adoption of demand-response rules, for an
excellent discussion of the possible preemption challenges to demand response, see
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 244, at 412-19 (urging a coordinated federalism
approach to demand response).
247. See JENKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 ("[N]early all clean tech segments remain
reliant on public policy support and subsidy. That support is now poised to decline
precipitously, presenting new challenges and raising the possibility of market turmoil
ahead for several US clean tech markets.").
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regional opportunities and challenges, and are more likely to place
the costs of these programs with those groups of customers most
likely to benefit. Clean energy floors can also provide for more
frequent updating and adaptation of subsidies as new technologies
develop.
III. FLOOR PREEMPTION'S CHALLENGES FOR MULTI-PURPOSE
REGULATORY STATUTES
Floor preemption has considerable promise to overcome
problems with fragmentation, stagnation, and stalemates in the
interpretation of energy statutes in developing clean energy policies.
Yet subnational regulatory innovations in energy law have been
hobbled by courts' expansive implied preemption approach to
statutory standards, as is perhaps best illustrated by judicial decisions
imposing price ceilings for renewable projects under PURPA and
judicial inventions such as the filed rate doctrine that impose
wholesale electric power price ceilings under the FPA. Such doctrines
emphasize a singular statutory purpose as completely preempting
state or local regulation under a conflict or obstacle analysis, and limit
innovation by subnational regulators including states, localities, and
RTOs. Although floor preemption is consistent with the history and
framework of both PURPA and the FPA, at least in addressing
certain clean energy issues, not every energy statute, and certainly not
every regulatory statute, calls for cooperative federalism. Congress
has a variety of federalism approaches at its disposal in addressing
regulation issues. In this Part, we address some of the limits to floor
preemption. After surveying some of these pragmatic limits to floor
preemption, including the challenge of multiple-goal statutes and
public choice problems, we advance an implied preemption
framework to assist courts in identifying strong statutory candidates
for floor preemption in energy law and other regulatory contexts, and
also highlight when it is inappropriate to impose a floor preemption
approach on statutes.
A.

Regulatory Baselines and Multiple Goal Statutes
One challenge involved in favoring clean energy floors in energy
statutes centers on the difficulty and indeterminacy of setting
baselines in view of statutory guidance. Baseline concerns pervade
modern regulation, as any effort to push regulatory standards in a
direction must be evaluated with respect to its change from a status
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quo.2 48 Floor preemption is well adapted to unilinear regulation
problems involving identified baselines, like quantitative pollution
controls intended to protect the environment. In such contexts,
regulatory goals and targets are sufficiently well defined. If all policy
choices are to be evaluated with respect to their ability to mitigate the
same social ill, the floor approach can be used to ratchet all policy,
both federal and state, in a similar direction on the same continuum.
Moreover, to the extent that federal authorities clearly define the
regulatory baseline and articulate threshold goals for regulation, it is
rather simple to monitor whether various subnational approaches to
regulation are faithful to the federal floor. Perhaps this is one reason
that floor preemption has fit environmental law statutes so well. 24 9 A
floor preemption system is created, whether or not Congress has done
so expressly, when states are allowed to select different points on a
continuum that translate to the shared goal of more stringent
environmental regulation.
By contrast, it may be argued that standards in energy statutes
depart from this model in at least two respects. First, as described
above, energy statutes are typically not focused on addressing a single
social ill, but are more frequently focused on solving multidimensional problems. Second, goals in energy statutes do not
translate neatly into numerical standards along a single value
continuum, and thus are arguably less appropriate for a cooperative
floor preemption system. Neither concern is fatal to the idea of clean
energy floor preemption, though each inevitably presents some
challenges for any approach to preemption in energy law.
First, the argument that floor preemption is only appropriate for
unilinear goals would leave floor preemption for only the narrowest
regulatory problems. While it is true that on occasion Congress has
itself defined quantitative thresholds for problems in statutes, 250 in
most cases Congress delegates the definition of thresholds to
248. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of
Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2011)
(explaining the importance of comparing proposed regulations with historic baselines).
249. For instance, to the extent that Congress has selected a maximum permissible
number of parts per million (ppm) of a toxin, in a floor preemption regime state regulators
can impose a higher regulatory burden on industry by selecting a more stringent standard
(in this case, a lower number of ppm).
250. Statutes themselves may include specific thresholds (such as utilizing current
pollution levels as a baseline) and may also incorporate future goals or targets, such as the
1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which set a ninety percent reduction target for
automobile emissions by 1975. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006)).
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administrative agencies. Indeed, virtually every federal safety and
environmental standard in statutes delegates some discretion to
agency regulators to take into account a variety of different goals in
defining a pollution standard.251 The EPA's definition of the "best
available control technology" ("BACT") for emissions, for instance,
is not decided by simply picking a point on a numerical continuum,
but by balancing a number of considerations, including energy
consumption, total source emissions, regional impacts, and cost. 25 2
Nevertheless, BACT serves as a federal floor. Thus, pollution
standards in environmental law often involve multiple goals that must
be balanced against the pursuit of pollution control objectives. It
would be an oversimplification of environmental law to suggest
otherwise. While they differ in kind from numerical environmental
standards, the standards in energy statutes, which are expressed in
terms such as "avoided cost" or "just and reasonable rates," also
involve a balance of multiple purposes. Thus it is not necessary to
limit floor preemption to only neatly-packaged quantitative problems
with pre-defined baselines in statutes.
Moreover, floor preemption is conceptually better adapted than
unitary preemption to multi-purpose statutes where Congress has
delegated authority to agency actors, and may be more consistent
with managing such delegations. A preemption floor provides a
federal regulator with the authority to make key decisions, while also
giving state and local governments the ability to adapt and
experiment. Such an approach allows Congress to retain a threshold
standard for evaluating performance with respect to the goals of the
statute. Congress enjoys the security of knowing that a certain floor
will be met, and can review whether the agency's handling of its
delegated authority, and the various state and local approaches, serve
the values of the statute. By contrast, a unitary ceiling standard gives
Congress no clear standard for evaluating performance, other than
whether the ceiling has been surpassed.
Yet one concern with preemption tools such as floors in multipurpose statutes is that at the extreme they may lead to value
relativism and subjectivity in statutory interpretation, potentially
obscuring whether the statutes are implemented in a way that is
consistent with Congress's intent. For example, another way of

251. For example, regulatory standards promulgated pursuant to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act and the CAA that delegate basic tradeoffs to agencies are discussed
in Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?,94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1425-39 (2008).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006).
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framing the FPA's "just and reasonable" standard under the filed rate
doctrine is not as a ceiling per se, but as a floor on the ability of
utilities to recover rates. If this were the case, state regulators would
be able to allow in-state utilities to recover a firm's costs from retail
customers regardless of wholesale rates. Taken to its extreme, such an
approach would undermine the point of federal rate regulation
altogether, in that it would allow states to favor in-state firms over
out-of-state suppliers.2 53 However, the purposes of the FPA's price
regulation regime, discussed above, did not include ensuring firm
cost-recovery-indeed, the history of the FPA features instances of
utilities challenging aspects of the statute for failing to provide such
recovery.2 54
Fortunately, when Congress delegates to an agency with multiple
regulatory purposes, it is rarely so open-ended that all vectors for
consideration are bidirectional; typically, Congress is motivated by a
primary purpose or advancing some goal or protecting some value.
Thus, close attention to statutory purpose is necessary to guide
interpretations of open-ended statutory language. In other words, if
assessed against the backdrop of a statute's purposes and the basic
directional goals Congress was considering in its adoption and later
amendments, preemption tools like floors need not commit courts to
the extreme indeterminacy of statutory purpose relativism.
Furthermore, another answer to the value relativism critique is
that floor preemption is less likely than unitary preemption to
produce judicial statutory interpretations that ossify regulation. Some
implied preemption may still be inevitable in defining what floors are,
but as we discuss below, these choices will be left in the first instance
to regulators; by contrast a unitary preemption approach is more
likely to leave definition of the statutory ceiling to courts. Moreover,
as judicial approaches such as the filed rate doctrine under the FPA
illustrate, once a set of values is defined by judicial precedents, it
constrains the ability of both federal and subnational regulators to
adapt that statute to new regulatory problems. By contrast, floor
preemption ensures that when values are to be weighed or calibrated

253. As discussed above, case law developed under the filed rate doctrine prohibits this
kind of conduct. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing price squeeze).
254. Many early constitutional challenges to New Deal statutes involving energy and
their implementation focused on how federal regulation interfered with the protection of
firms' investment-backed expectations. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi,
DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1453-57 (2000) (discussing
takings cases under the Natural Gas Act and the FPA).
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in multi-purpose statutes it will be done in the first instance not by
courts, but by Congress or an administrative agency.
B.

Public Choice Problems
Another objection to adopting widespread floors in preemption
analysis of energy statutes is the concern that it may create an
opening for decision-making that is plagued by public choice
problems. Increasing state and local autonomy can, of course, both
encourage parochialism and contribute to collective action problems.
Each of these problems merits attention in assessing a statute's
approach to preemption, but we maintain that neither inherently
favors a unitary standard approach to preemption where Congress
has not made that choice itself. Instead, much depends on the
statutory framework and on the specified goals of a regulatory
program.
Since James Madison's Federalist No. 10,255 federalism
discussions have focused on the concern that state or local officials
are more likely than their federal counterparts to enact policies
motivated by self-interest or parochial local concerns.2 56 Even where
subnational regulators purport to be motivated by consumer or
environmental protection concerns, their regulatory decisions may
favor incumbent firms or powerful interests. Relatedly, states may
enact laws that, intentionally or unintentionally, limit the
participation of out-of-state energy producers in energy markets.
Given the long history of state-sanctioned power monopolies,1 7 few
regulatory arenas rival energy regulation in presenting a strong risk of
state regulation favoring in-state incumbents and disfavoring new
entrants and out-of-state firms. Indeed this concern was one of the
main purposes behind passage of the FPA, as the statute was
designed primarily to help address the Attleboro Gap-the void of
regulation left behind by the sweeping disqualification of states from
regulating interstate transactions.5 The FPA thus provided a
structure designed to disable states from the extremes of protectionist
wholesale price regulation that imposed significant costs on other
states, without displacing the ability of states to pursue their own
retail pricing policies.

255. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84-85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
256. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and
InstitutionalDesign, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 551, 555-59 (2001).
257. See Spence & Prentice, supra note 162, at 141-43.
258. See supra notes 171173-77 and accompanying text.
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However, given the increasing importance of regional, suprastate RTOs, it is far from clear that subnational regulation will lead to
protectionist approaches, even in the energy context where powerful
firms may have disproportionate influence in state and local politics.
Consider the example of regional transmission cost allocation
addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Commerce Commission.2 5 9
In contrast to the strict cost causation approach of Judge Posner's
opinion for the majority, a notable advantage of PJM's proposed (and
rejected) approach for regional transmission cost allocation was that
it would have encouraged greater investment in transmission lines by
allowing investors to spread more broadly the costs of new lines with
systemic benefits. PJM's policy presumably sought to counter the
traditional resistance to incurring costs for new transmission lines
located elsewhere, despite their systemic benefits. PJM's proposed
transmission cost allocation plan thus provides a convenient
illustration of how subnational autonomy does not necessarily lead to
protectionism. In fact, in this context a broader reading of the
statute's goals to treat the just and reasonable standard as a floor,
rather than a unitary standard, could actually help regional entities
innovate to overcome state and local holdouts.2" For this reason, we
think courts should be reluctant to impose unitary standards onto
multi-purpose statutes to preempt supra-state regulatory approaches,
especially where these have been approved by national regulators like
FERC.
Putting aside supra-state regulatory approaches as an answer to
parochialism concerns, such concerns may be least salient where the
policies at issue impose substantial costs at the state and local level, as
do clean energy policies such as feed-in tariffs and renewable
portfolio standards. 261 A state or local government that enacts clean
energy regulation is typically voluntarily incurring a localized cost in
exchange for a perceived benefit that is in the future, uncertain, and
dispersed beyond its own geography. Such regulation externalizes
259. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing ICC case).
260. On the broader advantage of regional entities in addressing renewable energy
challenges, see Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 477, 477-514 (2011) (arguing that regional governance is preferable for
overcoming barriers to renewable energy development).
261. Cf Klass, supra note 85, at 364-65 (arguing that an important consideration in
granting states greater leeway in regulating is whether there are "concerns regarding states
acting in a protectionist manner at the expense of out-of-state industry," and concluding
that this concern is unpersuasive in the context of appliance efficiency because "states
have been motivated thus far to enact regulations based on efforts to achieve state energy
efficiency goals or GHG reduction goals, not protecting local manufacturers").
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benefits, not costs. This scenario, much like heightened state
environmental regulation, simply does not constitute unfair treatment
of neighbors and does not call for restraining state actors under
principles designed to combat such mistreatment. Instead, it argues
strongly for allowing states and localities the leeway to regulate.
On the other hand, while the ill of state and local protectionism
may be overstated in the area of clean energy regulation, this is not to
say that this regulatory arena is immune. The protectionism concern
can be very real where there is no coordination of policies between
jurisdictions, or where one jurisdiction's approach creates nonreciprocal costs that produce highly localized benefits. For example,
in existing clean energy regulation, some states have shown an
unsettling willingness to mandate that activities necessary for
compliance with the regulation be conducted entirely within a state.
A prominent example is state renewable portfolio standards. In 2010,
the Canadian energy infrastructure company TransCanada sued the
state of Massachusetts, alleging that the Massachusetts RPS, which
required that in-state long-term power sales contracts to meet the
RPS must be with in-state sources, 262 violated the dormant commerce
clause.263 In connection with a partial settlement of the case,
Massachusetts amended the offending provision of its RPS.2 " Other
RPSs contain similar requirements 265 or provide disproportionate
benefits to power suppliers from within a particular state.266
262. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F(g) (LexisNexis 2012) ("In satisfying its annual
obligations under subsection (a), each retail supplier shall provide a portion of the
required minimum percentage of kilowatt-hours sales from new on-site renewable energy
generating sources located in the commonwealth ....

");

see Steven Ferrey, The New

Climate Metric: The Sustainable Corporationand Energy, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383,
401 (2011).
263. See Complaint at 1, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070FDS (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010).
264. Order Adopting Emergency Regulations, D.P.U. 10-58, at 5 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Utils. June 9, 2010) (codified at 220 MASS. CODE. REGS. 17 (2013)) (stating that the
"Department [of Public Utilities] suspends the applicability of the requirement ... that
renewable energy generation sources be located 'within the jurisdictional boundaries of
the [Cjommonwealth, including state waters or adjacent federal waters.' ").
265. California's RPS, for instance, places the requirement right in the definitions
section:
(a) "Renewable electrical generation facility" means a facility that meets all the
following criteria:

(2)(A) The facility is located in the state or near the border of the state with the
first point of connection to the transmission network of a balancing authority area
primarily located within the state.
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Viewed sympathetically, such RPS provisions reflect a concern
that nearby states will have laxer standards, and allowing
jurisdictional utilities to comply with the state RPS by tapping those
out-of-state sources will defeat the spirit of the RPS. They can also
reflect the desire to increase the stature of the renewable energy
industry within the state, a seemingly inoffensive impulse.267 A more
skeptical view, of course, is that they represent constitutionally
impermissible favoritism for in-state producers, or industrial sectors
that are unique to a particular state's geography, and thus
disadvantage out of state producers.
It bears noting that there are ways of ensuring against
protectionism without re-writing federal statutes to endorse unitary
preemption standards. In particular, the federal courts have
developed an elaborate dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, and
regularly apply it to restrain the protectionist impulses of state
governments. 268 Although it has long been criticized as inconsistent,269
the dormant commerce clause jurisprudence remains a safeguard for
evaluating the most problematic state laws that impose costs on new

(3) If the facility is outside the United States, it is developed and operated in a
manner that is as protective of the environment as a similar facility located in the
state.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25741(a)(2)(A), 25741(a)(3) (West 2013).
266. See, e.g., CAROLYN ELEFANT & EDWARD A. HOLT, CLEAN ENERGY STATES
ALLIANCE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAMS 14-15 (2011), http://www.cleanenergystates.org/

resource-library/resource/cesa-report-the-commerce-clause-and-implications-for-staterenewable-portfolio-standard-programs-pdf (highlighting some RPS standards' emphasis
on favoring local technologies, such as swine waste in North Carolina, fuel cells in
Connecticut, and poultry litter in Maryland).
267. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740.5(c) (West 2013) ("The program objective
shall be to increase, in the near term, the quantity of California's electricity generated by
in-state renewable electricity generation facilities."). Indeed, it seems incoherent to say
that a state legislature can use an RPS to modify the mix of energy that reaches
consumers, but cannot use the same legislative tool to require the production of more
local clean energy. Nevertheless, that seems to be the result of the interaction between the
dormant commerce clause and renewable portfolio standards.
268. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994).
But see United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 340-45 (2007) (distinguishing Carbone with a public/private facility analysis); see also
Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States' Rights: Discerning
the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 507, 579-82 (2004).
269. See, e.g., Brandon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 449-477 (2008) (describing how cases applying
the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine show that the doctrine is experiencing
"calcification," and lacks consistent rules and Constitutional grounding).
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entrants and out-of-state firms without producing broader geographic
benefits to justify these costs. 270 Attributing a unitary preemption
standard to federal energy statutes like PURPA and the FPA could
serve a similar purpose, to the extent such statutes are construed to
preempt state regulation entirely. 271 But such an interpretation throws
the baby out with the bathwater: it would demean the role of states in
a federalist system to suppose that the mere fact that they may
occasionally regulate impermissibly in a certain area is reason to
preclude them from regulating in that area ab initio, especially if this
becomes a basic approach to statutory interpretation in areas such as
energy regulation.
And finally, to think that protectionist behavior is alleviated by
courts favoring unitary preemption standards is to ignore that this
context is one where industry ability to lobby Congress and the
federal government may be at its strongest. As J.R. DeShazo and
Jody Freeman have argued, ceiling preemption is likely to be the
result of "defensive preemption"-interest groups' successful
lobbying for federal regulation as a way of bypassing undesirable
regulatory approaches at the subnational level.272 If unitary
preemption choices by Congress are the result of lobbying by the
best-organized industry interest groups, then courts should favor an
approach that ensures that this choice only has a preemptive effect
where it is express and explicit, rather than put a thumb on the scale
in interpreting statutes to favor these interest groups. Statutory
interpretation decisions that impose unitary choices through implied
preemption would make such choices far less transparent and would
encourage the kind of regulatory choices that yield to strong interest
groups without widespread and public support.
In short, concerns with self-interest and parochialism should not
obstruct a presumption in favor of floor preemption contexts such as
270. See id. (discussing the current state of the dormant commerce clause).
271. One possible exception is the provision of the Federal Power Act, section 206, that
requires the Commission to ensure that rates are not "unduly discriminatory." 16 U.S.C.
§ 824e(a) (2006). Throughout the long history of the FPA, this provision has been applied
to prevent discrimination by transmission owners, who are disinclined to transmit energy
produced by competitors. See, e.g., Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). To the
knowledge of the authors, section 206 has not been applied to prevent state-by-state
discrimination, although its language is probably broad enough for that purpose.
Nevertheless, as described above, precedent is available that is tailor-made for that
purpose.
272. See J.R. Deshazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1504-16 (2007).

1348

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

clean energy. It is not clear that floor preemption will favor parochial
over national concerns, and the example of transmission line siting
illustrates how subnational regulation can actually help in overcoming
certain state and local holdout problems. Moreover, with respect to
many new policies, including clean energy-oriented policies, parochial
decisions seem unlikely because the policies are initially very costly.
To the extent that they violate the dormant commerce clause by
impermissibly favoring local business, an adequate safeguard exists in
the federal dormant commerce clause jurisprudence without reading
new values onto federal statutes.
However, having made the above efforts to disarm public choice
criticisms of floor preemption, it remains that, in some cases,
collective action problems may make a single national standard
necessary. We do not dismiss uniformity as a desirable national goal
for regulation in appropriate contexts. For instance, regulatory
uniformity may be necessary to promote investment, or to allow
business to operate in highly uncertain and volatile environments.
Nuclear safety standards are one example where such a unitary
standard may make sense, since no single state may be able to solve
this kind of collective action problem on its own. Also, in some
contexts the costs of regulation will be so high and its benefits so
diffuse and impossible to identify or monitor that a single standard
will be necessary. If promoting uniformity or having a single uniform
standard is the major purpose driving a statute or regulatory program,
this kind of concern might properly motivate Congress to adopt a
unitary standard in the context of a statute.
Our advocacy of a floor preemption approach to energy statutes
does not reject these possibilities, but only counsels that such a choice
should be a deliberate political choice of either Congress (reinforced
by courts through express preemption) or agencies in the form of a
regulation. Reliance on courts applying an implied preemption
analysis should be disfavored as a means of determining whether
uniformity is called for, especially in the context of multi-purpose
statutes. Such an approach permits the least political of the branches
to decide when uniformity concerns should trump other values in
statutes. Moreover, if what is really valued is predictability, federal
courts with their limited geographic reach will have limited capacity
to make singular legal interpretations unless and until conflicts are
resolved by the Supreme Court; this limitation contrasts with both
Congress and the executive agencies, which can make explicit
political judgments with national scope. For example, until the U.S.
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Supreme Court clarified that FIFRA was a floor statute, industry
nationwide had to adjust to multiple circuit approaches. 27 3
C.

A Frameworkfor Evaluating Preemption Tools
Instead of focusing on the policy question of supremacy, the
fundamental question for courts in assessing preemption tools is
whether any departure from the federal scheme is consistent with the
balance of purposes behind a statute as determined by either
Congress or an agency-a question that is fundamentally grounded in
statutory interpretation. The challenge for courts in preemption
analysis is to articulate a workable analysis for determining whether,
in the absence of textual guidance, subnational regulation will be
allowed against the backdrop of federal regulatory programs. To a
large degree, discussion of preemption tools bears similarity to
substantive supremacy choices under preemption doctrine. Yet, while
similar political and policy considerations may motivate assessment of
preemption tools for legislative and agency decision makers,2 74 these
should not dictate the analysis of reviewing courts. The dispositive
preemption question cannot be so simple as whether, in the eyes of a
reviewing court, state and local regulation could conceivably produce
inconsistencies with any of the purposes embodied in a federal
statute. Similarly, Adam Babich has warned that not every conflict
with a legislative purpose should result in preemption, as the key
touchstone is the "full federal regulatory purpose" of a statute, not an
inquiry that gives every identifiable purpose a trump over state and
local law.2 75 Given large, multipurpose federal statutes, most
subnational regulation in contexts such as promoting clean energy
and other new technologies will present this risk.
Our analysis of clean energy floors illustrates how the answer to
this statutory interpretation question will depend on several distinct
legal inquiries. The first is whether there is a decision, by either
Congress or an agency, to substantively preempt in the first place-a
decision that we argue should be understood as analytically distinct
from the tools of preemption. Second, in deciding the appropriate
tools of preemption, as with other preemption inquiries it will be
273. See Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children's Health Policy, and Common Law
Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 89, 120-24 (2005).
274. See Klass, supra note 85, at 364-65 (presenting four policy factors to assess
whether uniformity interests in a regulatory standard are strong enough to justify ceiling
preemption).
275. See Adam Babich, The Supremacy Clause, Cooperative Federalism, and the Full
FederalRegulatory Purpose,64 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
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important for a court to engage in a basic statutory interpretation
analysis of identifying the goals of a regulatory program. Finally, once
these goals have been identified, courts will need to apply an implied
preemption analysis to decide which tools best fit which kinds of
regulatory programs.
1. Evaluating Congressional Intent to Preempt
Initially, our study of preemption tools in the clean energy
context stresses the importance of disentangling the decision of a
national political actor, whether Congress or an administrative
agency, to substantively preempt state and local law, from a decision
regarding the tools of preemption. The former inquiry is, at its core, a
political decision by either Congress or an administrative agency to
adopt national supremacy with respect to a particular substantive
issue of economic or social regulation. Where Congress explicitly
makes such a choice itself, courts stand on solid ground in finding
some preemption, but even this does not fully answer the issue of
which tools are appropriate to the problem. The form and scope of
preemption is much more an inquiry into regulatory design for
accomplishing a particular purpose. Sometimes Congress will pick
this regulatory design itself. As is discussed above, statutes such as the
CWA and CAA clearly preempt state and local law, and Congress
has also chosen a distinct effect for preemption in such contexts, in
the form of floor preemption, over unitary preemption.27 6
On the other hand, where Congress is silent or ambiguous about
substantive preemption, the substantive preemption decision and the
regulatory design decision will be made by an agency to which
Congress has delegated authority, but they should be assessed as two
distinct and independent decisions. As to substantive preemption,
ideally an agency will make any substantive preemption decisions in a
transparent political process, where an agency head actually makes a
political choice, such as in the adoption of a notice and comment
rule.277 Courts should favor these kinds of agency substantive
decisions to preempt over dubious claims of preemption based on no
agency decision,278 or claims of agency preemption that are patched
276. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
277. See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 869, 899 (2008)
(noting that the "additional burdens imposed on the agency by such procedures [as notice
and comment rulemaking), moreover, increase the enactment costs of preemptive
regulation").
278. As others have noted, substantive field preemption based on a potential for
agency regulation is highly suspect. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption,
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together from several disparate, less visible regulatory decisions that
do not acknowledge the preemption decision they purportedly
support. If a deliberate and visible agency choice to substantively
preempt state and local law itself also speaks directly to the tools of
preemption, courts should give credence to the agency's choice. If the
agency itself has not made any such decision, however, our review of
clean energy regulation highlights a remaining need for courts to
assess preemption tools before limiting the choices of subnational
actors.
2. Identifying Regulatory Goals to Use the Proper Tools
Outside of scenarios where the scope or form of preemption is
clearly defined by Congress or an agency, our review of floor
preemption in energy statutes stresses the significance of reviewing
courts making an effort to identify the range of regulatory purposes in
a statute as a part of an analysis of the tools of preemption and their
effects. As the Supreme Court noted in Wyeth v. Levine,"' "[T]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption
case."280 Several principles might inform courts' identification of
statutory and regulatory purposes regarding the scope and form of
preemption. The fewer the regulatory goals in a statute, the more
likely ceiling preemption will be appropriate, with unitary standards
best fitting single dimension regulatory problems and floor
preemption best fitting multi-dimension statutes. A related question
is whether, in multi-dimensional statutes, some values are given
greater weight by Congress. In some instances, there will be evidence
that Congress has prioritized these values, and a court will be able to
determine how they relate to preemption, using the implied
preemption principles highlighted below.
Where Congress itself has not given specific weights to different
statutory purposes, it will in many cases have delegated tradeoffs in
selecting preemption tools to an administrative agency. As a general
matter, judges should be wary of making those tradeoffs themselves,
and as with any substantive preemption decision, should favor
tradeoffs made by an agency in a transparent political process where
an agency has actually made a political choice, such as in the adoption
of a rule through the notice and comment process. 281 Indeed,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (2010) (arguing that a federal regulator's preemption by
inaction exacerbates, rather than mitigates, problems arising from state regulation).
279. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
280. Id. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
281. See, e.g., Young, supra note 277, at 899 (making this argument).
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identifying the multiple regulatory purposes of a statute and the
balance of values takes on even greater significance for preemption
analysis where a court is reviewing an agency regulatory choice,
rather than an express choice of Congress, and inevitably requires
some judicial humility in approaching the task of identifying
preemption tools.
An agency to which these choices are delegated may favor
unitary standards over floor preemption. If a court were to establish
unitary preemption in such a context, that court should seek to avoid
ossifying future adaptations of regulatory solutions over time.
Therefore, a court ought to recognize that the agency's use of a
certain preemption tool is not the only available interpretation of a
statute's goals. In affirming an agency's resolution of a preemption
question, a court is endorsing how the agency has chosen to define
the regulatory purposes for this particular problem at this particular
time-not as a singular reading of the statute that will dictate
solutions for every other problem at any possible point in the future.
For example, courts deciding that the "just and reasonable" language
under the FPA requires FERC wholesale rates to serve as a ceiling on
any other rate for wholesale market have not only made a
preemption ruling that limits state or local regulators. They have also
effectively privileged that reading of the statutory language in judicial
opinions, which could preclude FERC itself from adopting a new
balance or broader set of goals in interpreting the statute and that
have left energy law ill-suited to adapt to new problems, such as
climate change.
3. Implied Preemption Analysis
Finally, our discussion of floors in energy statutes highlights that
a complete implied preemption analysis should accompany judicial
assessment of preemption tools in energy and other regulatory
statutes.
However, as discussed in many of the environmental and energy
examples in this Article, Congress is often unclear or ambiguous with
respect to preemption tools. It has long been acknowledged that, even
if Congress has not expressly preempted subnational regulation, a
statute may impliedly preempt regulatory choices through the use of
tools like unitary standards. Both acts of Congress and agency
decisions regarding preemption tools raise implied preemption
challenges for courts. As a general matter, if a court is going to make
any determination regarding an approach to preemption tools based
on the Supremacy Clause, floor preemption is the least activist and
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intrusive, is the most politically accountable, and leaves the most
space for both federal and subnational law to adapt to new
circumstances.
When the source of supremacy in defining preemption tools is an
act of Congress, the ultimate inquiry will be into legislative purpose,
with a particular focus on the history and structure of the statute at
issue. A number of considerations can come into play in assessing the
form of preemption in such contexts, including whether Congress
itself has given uniformity purposes primacy over other statutory
purposes. To begin, absent express evidence of congressional intent
to occupy a field, judicial decisions seem to disfavor field preemption
based on the mere possibility of federal regulation as an overbroad
approach that is inconsistent with any recognition of state
autonomy.28 2 Rather, conflict preemption provides a sounder basis for
any implied preemption analysis of the form and scope of agency
regulation.283 In some contexts, such as in determining the preemption
effects of product standards, Congress may have good reason to give
uniformity purposes primacy, and an implied preemption analysis
may lead to a determination that a statute contains unitary standards
or a ceiling. But even this kind of analysis may need to evaluate the
range of purposes, including whether it is possible for state and local
governments to push product standards above the federal floor, and if
so, whether Congress intended to foreclose that innovation.2 8
Where Congress has identified a range of purposes but has
delegated the balance of these purposes or the weighing of values to
an agency, courts are still in the realm of implied preemption analysis
but face additional complexities in deciding the appropriate
preemption tools. In making such a decision, courts should take a
lesson from basic administrative law preemption principles. Courts
should only draw preemption implications from agency action, and
should be wary of attributing any preemptive effect to agency
inaction.' For example, this criticism applies to the way the courts
282. For a discussion of field preemption, the ultimate exercise of preemptive power
where states are left no ability whatsoever to regulate an activity, as a basis for broad
preemption where Congress or an agency is not actively regulating an activity, see Nash,
supra note 278, at 1041-44.
283. Some have also argued that all obstacle preemption in the context of addressing
the form of preemption should be analytically reducible to conflict preemption. See
Babich, supra note 275, at 7-9.
284. See Klass, supra note 85, at 364-67.
285. For critiques of preemption through inaction, see Glicksman, supra note 64, at 1822. See generally Nash, supra note 278 (criticizing a finding of preemption where a federal
regulator takes no action).
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have approached the "just and reasonable" standard under the filed
rate doctrine.286
Beyond this consideration, the approach to agency preemption
tools should pay attention to democratic accountability. Nina
Mendelson has argued that, as a general matter, courts should
disfavor agency preemption, especially based on obstacle preemption
analysis, absent clear indication of the circumstances that Congress
contemplated agency preemption of states.2 7 Her argument is that,
compared to Congress, agency preemption decisions are less likely to
be reached through a democratic process that respects the
sovereignty interests of states.28 8 Mark Seidenfeld and Brian Galle
call into question whether this view of agency decision making is
overly simplistic and overly impressed with the congressional decision
making process, and instead advocate giving agencies themselves
broad authority to make decisions regarding preemption.28 9 Yet still,
to the extent that Mendelson's concerns render suspect some broad
preemption claims based on agency decisions, this would advise in
favor of adopting floor approaches over unitary standards where
there is ambiguity or a lack of a clear political choice by the agency. If
a court is to find any preemption from agency regulation, it should
generally favor a floor approach that leaves agencies the ability to
draw on states to fill in the details of regulatory implementation, over
a more intrusive judicial finding of a unitary preemption standard.2 "
A finding of floor preemption would draw on statutory purposes,
286. See Rossi, supra note 19, at 1645-46 (noting that an analysis of implied
preemption under the filed rate doctrine should evaluate whether an agency actually
considered the matter, not merely whether the agency had potential jurisdiction to
regulate and did not do so).
287. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U.
L. REV. 695, 706-25 (2008). See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,
102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004) (arguing that, absent further guidance from Congress as to
when a state law is preempted, courts faced with an ambiguous statute may apply a
presumption against preemption, while exercising discretion as to the level of deference
paid to an agency's interpretation).
288. See Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, supra note 287, at
709.
289. For a superb critique of judicial efforts to limit agency jurisdiction in the name of
federalism, see Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933
(2008). See also generally Gregory M. Dickinson, CalibratingChevron for Preemption, 63
ADMIN L. REv. 667 (2011) (discussing the interplay between the Chevron standard and
preemption doctrine and when each should dominate).
290. The risk of "defensive preemption" by industry through unitary standards, and
especially preemption ceilings, see DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 272, at 1504-16, is all
the more reason to require such a choice to be made in a deliberate and transparent
manner, as express preemption would require.
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which Congress is more likely to have discussed or considered in
adopting a statute in the first instance, and not on details Congress is
unlikely to have actually considered or voted on.
In this sense, as a preemption tool, the floor approach can
provide a middle ground for implied preemption analysis without
inviting courts to adopt judicially activist interpretations of statutes
that rest on weak democratic accountability and leave little space for
federal and subnational law to adapt in solving problems. Some
additional implied preemption analysis will still be necessary with our
approach. Like unitary preemption, floor preemption analysis
requires federal courts to assess whether subnational regulation
presents a conflict with or obstacle to a federal regulatory program.
But notably, the inquiry for floor preemption relates to whether
federal regulation and subnational regulation are moving in similar
general directions, given federal goals. Any preemption effect here
would relate to a judicial recognition of statutory purposes, as
opposed to the selection of a singular approach. Since this focuses on
a much broader assessment of the compatibility of regulatory
program goals and instruments, it reduces the likelihood of judicial
error or inconsistent approaches across circuits. By recognizing the
basic floor values of federal programs, where federal regulators
(whether Congress or an agency) have a clear direction for federal
regulation in mind, federal regulators give state and local regulators
clearer signals regarding the direction for regulatory programs.
Federal regulators can provide a basic agenda for regulation without
dictating the details. For example, if in the context of transmission
capacity federal regulators were to endorse reliability goals that
include the integration of variable renewable resources into the grid,
it would create policy space for state and local regulators and RTOs
to provide for approaches to transmission cost recovery with these
goals in mind. As an approach to implied preemption, this is less
likely to lead courts to controversial statutory interpretation decisions
that will constrain the ability of future regulatory agencies in energy
and other important policy arenas to experiment and to adapt to new
circumstances.
CONCLUSION

Judicial decisions that embrace unitary standards based on an
implied preemption analysis in the interpretation of key energy
statutes have blinded regulators and courts from seeing the virtues of
clean energy floors. Many federal judicial decisions have attributed
unitary consumer protection standards to statutes such as PURPA
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and the FPA. This conventional approach endorses a singular
federalism model for energy statutes, limiting space for policy
innovation at both FERC and at the subnational level in addressing
important issues such as the promotion of clean energy. Yet it is a
mistake to commit major regulatory arenas such as energy regulation
to a single federalism model. Energy statutes allow for multiple
preemption tools to accommodate a diversity of federalisms rather
than a singular approach. In particular, interpreting energy statutes to
allow for floor preemption in certain contexts, such as clean energy,
holds promise to overcome fragmentation, stagnation, and stalemates,
especially where federal agencies already possess considerable
regulatory authority but Congress has failed to adopt recent
legislation addressing the issue.
While we draw mainly from the energy law example, we also
advance a preemption tool framework that agencies and courts can
look to in addressing complex, multi-faceted approaches to regulation
without imposing onto statutes a one-size-fits-all federalism model.
Floor preemption is hardly the only tool for implementing the
supremacy of federal law, and we certainly do not intend to suggest
that it is a superior form of preemption in all statutory contexts. But
in instances where Congress itself has not made an express regulatory
choice regarding the form of preemption, regulatory floors allow
federalism to address a range of concerns against the backdrop of
unclear and ambiguous statutes with multiple purposes that delegate
authority to regulatory agencies. Such an approach not only makes
policy sense for many areas of regulation, but also provides an
adaptive preemption tool for multi-purpose statutes, addresses public
choice concerns, promotes accountable regulation to solve new social
problems, incorporates new technologies with greater ease, and
minimizes the impacts of judicial error. For this reason, an implied
preemption framework for assessing regulatory floors will not only be
of crucial importance in addressing policy issues such as clean energy,
but also may allow a plurality of federalism models to flourish in
other regulatory arenas.

